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THE PHILOSOPHY OF DF.SCAR~ AS .A. JlETllOD OF ASSURAllCE

Introduction
The great, questions of life have made man pbiloaopbers.

While

the traditional task 0£ most philosop~ bas been one of synthesis and

clarification, it has shown a remarkabl1' persistent interest in the
problem of certainty.
has a l ~

Perhaps that 1a why the 1ndividual philosopher

been so eager to set down a

the be-all and end-all

•sys~• 11b1ch is

or metapbyaica.

accomplishing thia task. We

~ say

to become

Bo thinker bas succeeded in

that the problem is one of

1.Jnense difficulty since it involves innmaerable corollar;y questi~.
What is the nature

or man?

cesses? To what extent can

Vihat is the
be

nature ot his tbjnJdng pro-

know the material worldJ What ia his

destiny? And if we·want accurate annc,n., ~ ought not start
with any presuppositions whatsoever. However, the very nature of

tl).ought makos certain presuppositions necessar.r. Aa a matter

or

tact,

evep. the wording or. our questions may imply certain presuppositions.
It 1a this fallacy in our quest for certainty that SusfUllle Langer

points to when she sayss
Everything has become what it isJ everything has a cause;
every change must be to some endJ the world is a thing, md
IIIU8t have been made by some agency, out of some natural
aturr, tor some reason. These are natural ~ of tMnking.
Such implicit •wqs• are not avoad by the awrage man, but
simply followed. He is not consci~ of aasunaing my basic
princip1es. They are what a OermlD would call Ida "Weltanacbauung•, his attitude ot mind, rather than apecitic art-

1

2

icl.es ot faith. They constitute his outlook; they are
deeper than facts he may note or propositions he mq
moot.
·
~t, though they are not stated, t.hey find upreasions in .the FQRm OF HIS Q~IOllS •. A question is ·
really an ambiguous proposition; the answer is its determination. The~ can be only a cert.ain
of
alternatives that will complete i~ sense.

!umber

The~e few thoughts serve to emphasise the many stumbllng-etones
along man•s search for assurance.

Despite the stumbling-stones there

~ve been many great 100n who have made the search.

Rene Descartes was

such a man,. one dec:apzy interested in certainty. He humb~ announces

that he •never conte~ted anything higher ~an the reformation ot
. ·my own opinions, and basing them on a foundation wholly uq

Oll!l.•2

?lonetbeless, Descartes does have a system, and one be sincerely be-

lieves valid.

Although it is true that IDIIDY have found i'ault with

Descartes calling his proofs tor the ¢stence of God doubtful, and
bis understanding or the relationship of mind and matter fallacious,
be i8 worthy of study because

or bis contribution tq the doctrine ot

certainty. It is the purpose of this paper to diacqss Descartes•
philosophy as a method of certainty.

l. Susanne· Langer# PhilosopbY in a New !!l, PP• 1, 2.
2. Rene Descartes, Discourse. ~~, P• 13..
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I. Status

or Thought a't·the Time or Descartea

Coming into the wo1·ld fifty years e.tter

the

death

ot

J&art1n :Wtber•

Descartes was born into the titanic struggle betliaen the old world and
the new.
1188

The age 0£ the supremacy of the Roman Church bad passed.

a period

or

adjustment to the new world of Protestant thought•

the emancipation of the human spirit. Three general currents

or

It.

or

thought

characterize the late sixteenth and the earq seventeenth centuries.

These are the counter-Retomation with 1ta remants of Scholastic thought,
the attitude

or scepticism stemming tram the

Renaissance, and the develop-

ment ot science. Let us consider them separateq.
We begin with the counter-Reformation.

~ enough it

was a

goneral council, something long opposed byr.popes lrhich most assisted in
the rovival of the Roman Church after ·the Retormation.

Pau1 III. a1'ter

much discussion• was prevailed upon by Charles V to issue a call for a

general council to take place at
the 4ecision.

himself.

Trent.

Paul had diplomatic reasons for

He wanted to prevent Charles !rm ~aline with the problems

The two principal. purposes o£ the council wre to deal with

doctrine and reform.

The problem

or

the settlemnt of dogma arose about

the time ot the Religious Treaty at Augsburg in

l.SSS.

!be matter of

reform was a problem that reached back into the middle agea.

The reactionary party represented by

caratra and

triumphed over the more evangelical Catholics.

the Jesuits

Tradition as affirmed

as a source of knowledge and 1188 given equal authority with the Scriptures.
Taking courage £rom Char1es, apparent victories in the Smalcaldic ware,

the council reestablished the old doctrines with scarcely arq moditicatiom.

Because of t he authority or Augustine, the 'lboraiats maintained a alight
superiority over the nOiilinaliata. Thomism became the accepted standard

or

dogma in the Roman Catholic Church. This did not mean that other

outlooks 11Cre discouraged. New ideas, with certain qualifications,. were
welcOQOd, and the scholastic traditions 11Bre allowed to continue.

This

was especially true in the schools or the Jesuits. Because ot the revival of Scholaoticism after the Council

or Trent, we must

exaa1ne same

I

or the characteristics or

the Scholastic

movement.
,

Scholasticism had, on the llhole, supported the pretensions of the
church.

But it haci. not been so docile a handrna1den aa is commrn,Jy

alleged.

There were som who could not reconcile their philosophy wit.b

the established Roman dogma.

Weber notes this wapardness in t.be

Scholastic movement when be writes1

The more familiar ,.a become with scholastic literature,
the less apt we are to exaggerate the progress or tree
thought from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries.
The historians who endeavor to trace all modern negations
to tho Reformation, ignore, or attect to ·ignore, the fact,
that in the ninth century tbe Catholic Sc;otus Erigena
~nied eternal punishment; that in the twl.tt,h, the Catholic Abelard declared the teachings of the Greek philosophers to be superior to those or the Old Testament.;
that in the thirteenth, a great~ of Catholics refused to balieva in the mraculous conception and in the
resun-ection or Christ; that in the same century, or two
hundred )'laars before the Reformation,. and at the time
When the power of the no~ See W88 at its ~ight, St.
Thomas and Duns Scotus found tbemSelves obliged to prove,
111th all the arts 0£ logic, tbe need of revelation and
the credibility of the Divine WordJ fin&JJy that these
submissive, devoted and orthodox doctors of tbe church
combined with their Christian convictiODB a treedan ot
thought the like of which is but rare~ 111Bt with in1
the Protestant theology o1' the aevanteanth century.
1.

Alfred WeberI Hiatory ,!?!

PbilosoPl\Y, P•

].96.

s
Of course, Weber writ.ea with a biaa.

Be tails to see \bat. 1lb1l8

Scholastic thought often differed troa the traditional dogma ot ta
Roman Church, that it had to exercise tbia •tree thought• such as

it was, •underground". VJhat then of these theologians? They were
~ound and could advance very little before they were stopped by the

church authorities. Veitch correct,]¥ observesa
Scllolast,icism l'mS a body of thought remarkable tor
its order and sytlOOtry, 11ell lmit and squared, solid
and massive like a mdieval fortress. But it was inadequate as an expression and representation or the tree
lire that was working in literature, and even in out-aide nascent phUosopby at the t1me.l
Furthermore, Scholasticism like a house divided against itself
lacked the vigor to break the bonds llhich held it captive.

It re-

mained for the secular thought of the Renaissance and the religious
thought o~ t,he. Reformation to accoq,ljab that. This want or vigor
·1 s traceable also to the

very nature ot Scholasticim.

Scholasticima

was within the church, and yet found itself unable to accept the taith

ot the church. The efforts of the Scholastics wre in the direction

or proving

their faith.

prove it.

Usuall;r, the very term faith implies the acceptance ot

But faith ceases to be faith when one llllch

something ·which is not demonstrable. i'Jhen the Scholastics employed
•
reason in the manner in which Anselm, Aqulll&S and Scotus employed it•

one is moved to say that the religion of faith is no
recognizing this 11eakness in the faith

ot

!301"8.

Weber,

St. ThOIIU • therefore pert-

inently observes:
In st. Thomas Scholastic pbilosopl:\Y sb:inea lli.t.h ~
light before which the moat illuatr.loos names pale. His
de"9'0tion to ttie church and Ua intereeta, bis pblloaophic

1. John Veitch,

.!!!! PbiloaopbY _!! Descartes,

P• 7.

6

talents~ which ha eJll)lO)'B 1n the service ot C&tholicln,
and his faith in the perfect harmony bet.wen the dogma
and philosophic truth as set tortb by Ariatotle, mak8
him the most typical doctor ot the church atter st.
Augustine and s.t . Anselm. But his faith~ ardent though
it was, did not possess the strength of an unabakabl.8
conviction; it is rat.her a willed faith., an energetic
will constantly struggling against a thou.s~d ditfi•

culties which reflection throws in ita ~ ·
Thia innate ~almess never disappeared in Scholasticiam.

That 1a 1lby

it failed to make a mark upon secular tbink1ng.. Though its basic
tenota were preserved in and through the counter-Retormation, Scho~ c though~, at tho time of Descartes, was all but insignificant

out.Gide th? ch~c~.

It must not be overlooked, however, that Scho-

lasticism left 2!!!. important legacy to the Rena1aaance development.

Its emphasis on the po11er of reason left its mark on the Renaissance
man. Even though,, from the Scholastic point of view, Renaissance
minds distorted the capacity of reason, yet the tact rema:tus ; . reason

with them.., as with the Scholastics, was

ot utmost importance 1n

ascertain1ng truth.

Another current of thought evident at the close ot the sixteenth
century, was the scepticism which surrl:ved Rena1BADce thought.

The

Renaissance was a period of transition tram the medieval theological,

to the modern scientific interpretation of reallt,y. 1, stressed man
and his place in the universe.

It

1188

a reaction againat the con-

temporary standards of tbinJdng and a reversion to ·ancient cultures
in an ei'f'01.~ to escape medieval.ism. Its appeal to classic civilizations
had an influence on art, literature and customs. At. the same time,

however,. the Renaissance was bred on a certain scepticiSm. It doubted
the validity or the cultus 1n wllich people found themNlves.

!he

7

French thinker, Uontaigne, for instance, doubted the poss1b111ty

ot certain knowledge and SU&.,IJ'8sted a return to nature.
a drift away froza the authority

or

There was

the church wbich, through art

and letters J influenced even the church itself.

The

same scepticism

which pervaded th0 Uenaissance moV81iJ9nt infiltrated into the church
itself finding root even in the lives, conduct,

and attitudes

of

the clergy. Such an attitude, so all-pervasive left its legacy ot
scepticism and doubt for cany years following.

TbiB attitude 0£

mind p~ed a domnant role in the tb1~ng ot people ~ g the
age of Descartes. ·

Still another current of thought which dominated the period

ot Descartea• activities was the rise· of

Ini.ti-

the new science.

ated by Coperaicus, Kepler and Galileo it readily became a habit
of thought among the learned. The science
· world a new o{itlook.

or Copemicus

gave the

It .focussed attention on the law ot parsi-

mony.,. i.e., that the simpler expl.anation is the more reasonable.
It gave status to the hypothesis and brought the entire ezperi. mntal idea into popular esteem. This provided another road which
promised certainty.

Otber mn soon followed. Using the experi-

mental method, Galileo was able to confirm the theory

or

Copernicus.

It is important to distinguish two £actors in this new science, as
evidenced both in Copernicus and Galileo. Name~ the difference

bet119en the actual eq,loyment of certain JD9thods in the solution

ot it.he problem ·and the description or those
methods.
.
.
deacribes the methods

or both CopendcuS

and Galileo thuaa

·,u rzLAFF MEMORIAL LlBRA.l(l

i" ' ttA

st-:"\lNARY
~T. LOUI~. MQ.

COM ·,

Hort.brup

8

First, the discovery by analysis ot the basic
theoretical root or the problamJ aeconc:l, the MlA9ct1on
of the simplest phenomena ah1bit1ng the factora involved in the difficultyJ third, the 1nductive ~
servation of these relevant tactoraJ toarth, the pro-

ject,ion o£ relevant bypot.hesea auggeat.ed·by t.he nlnant.
f'actsJ fifth, the deduction ot logical consequences
trom each hypothesis, thereby permitting it to be put
to an experimental testJ s ~ , the claritication of
one•s initial problem 1n the light ot verified IJn><>thesisJ and. seventh, the generalisation ot one•s
solution by means of a pursuit ot logical implications
of t~ new concepts and theories 111th ~pect to other
subject matter and applications·. 1

Northrup is here describine the met.hod used by these t1lo men.

It

is to bo noted that, this method 1s akin, almost exact:cy' the same

as that employed by modern sciences. So

1118

can say ot the new

· science that it was truly scientific 1n t.hat it employed methods

almost equivalent to tbs best

1118

lmow today. How

h~,

as we

haw noted, we must distinguish method from DF8CRIPTIOH

ot method.

Northrup bas nice]¥ analysed the ·method employed by the

DBW

science.

However, this descriptive material is still coq:,aratiftly recent.
An understanding by the scientist of Descartes I day of the •thod

he used, why it produced good results, or failed raise~, was not

to be had. So we ma:.,r sa::, of the new science, that 1lbile 1t achieved
remarkable successes, it was at.ill groping. 'ftle reuon

why

it

1188

unable to clearly see the way before it was the profound lack of
~ i c descriptive material which would provide clue as to
scie~tirie I:Jethod and procedure.

These then, are the primarY currents o£ thought evident iJ1 tbs
age or Descartes. To repeat, t11q were the counter-aerormation with
1ta remnants of Scholastic thought, t,he sceptical attitude arising

rraa the Renaissance and the davelopaent of the

Dff

science.

9

II. · Descarteat 'Inf'luencea on tba Man

It is always difficult to anaqN the elementa llbich make a
man what he is.

I£ he has written a great deal it becomes an easier

matter. From the writings
out some

or

or Descartes

it iB not ditticult to mark

the principal factors which influenced hill.· ·

We find in tr.is sixteenth century philosopher, first of all, a
strong faith in the validity or reason. 'l'his faith appears to be
intimately connected ldth the attitude

or

scepticism inherited £ran

the Renaissance~ echoed in tho period during which he worked, and
described in t.11e previous chapter.

He bad become sceptical

forms of knowledge v-lth the possible exception
081:18

or

or all

mathematics.

This

scepticism shows itself in his mthod, llberein he makes a posi-

tive ei'for·t to doubt everything llhich he had formerly accepted as

t,ruth. But c2midst this general sceptic1ea he preserves his
· . the validity of reason.

taitb 1D

lfe feels that here (in reason) there is the

onzy antidote for the pretenses of thought and the fa]] acies natura1
to our thinking, which clutter our mind. Bis experience with various
forms of learning had made him scoptical
left

ot their worth. There was

to him a profound faith in the validity of reason. Therein are

two primm.-y characteristics oi Descartes' thought.

Another profound im"loonce on Descartes was bis interest in
IDatbematica.. He saws:

I was eapociall;y delighwd 11'.i.th mathamatics~ on
account of the certitude and evidence ot their rouonsJ
but l: had not as yet a precise Jmoll].edge o£ their tne
use~ and thinking that. they but

contributed

to tbD

lD

mechanical arts, I was astonished that toundationa

so strong and sure shoul\bave no loftier superstructure reared on them.
This interest in mathematics arose out
influenced him.

or the scepticiBm which

He saw, as he says,, that in mathematics he had

a solid foundation.

All his doubts could not alter the simple

-t ruths of mathematical demonstration. Furthermore., ma.tbematica
provided a s ·~riking aretir:JGnt fm.. bis i'aith in the validity

reason.

ot

lie felt that in ma.thematics, we have the purest example

or the exercise of human reason. Because mathematics tbua provided him 1'lith a foothold against absolute scepticism and because

it demonstrated the validity or reason thus employed in such a
pure form, Descartes lmew that here was b1a clue in the quest,
Burtt observes., "Descartes·• eagerness

certainty.

'

tor

tar certainty
.
.

and for effective demonstration was the main motiw behind bis

interest in mathematics. 112
Later

"'° ·Ifill discuss the influence of science on Descartes•
I

But while we are still on the subject of his interest 1n mathematics,
•

might add t.'1at it-,ms through mathematics that Descart.es was

lead to science.. As a matter. of fact, his principal SCIEtrID'IC

achievement

lmS

the

di;~owey oi ~ i c ge<mietry.

'l'hia show

the importance of mathematics upon the thought or Descartes.
.

.

. Fullei• points out t.he fact t,hat matbsmatics. played an important

role in Descai-tes, science., •Like Leonardo and Bacon, Descarte8
bad a vision of. the novel scientific method .and perceived the
l . Bene Descartes, Discourse on M a ~ • 7.
2. Edwin Burtt, Types .§! !@Iiifoua
CJPb.y, P• 176.

11

fundamental role that mathemtics

lraS_ top~

1D sc1entif1c investi-

gation and in the formulation of scientific bypotbeaea • .i '1'bus the

iq>ortance

or ma.thematics

to Descartes• seience. I.at.er w will see

the fundamental role mathematics played in the formulation or Des-

cartes• metaplzy'sics. So• mq

say

tbat one

or

the cb1et intluences

on the thought of Descartes was mathnatica I because it provided him

with hope against scepticism, faith in- t.he validity of reason, a
ground for certainty, and the foundation tor bis science and bis

metapeysics.
· How we would lll-e to consider another major intluence on the
thought of Descartes, namely the new science. Of course, Descartes
waa not a scientist in t.ho modern sense

or the word.

But be

1188

a

scientist nevertheless. Weber points outa

Descartes not 01'll;, uses imler obaervationJ he is
a learnod anatomist and peysiologist (so far as that
iras possible in too seventeenth century), and as such
appreciates the value or experience. He loves to
stu<t7 the GREAT BOOK OF THE VIORLDJ and for ~ e to
oppose him to Bacon on this point is sheer ignorance.
The most recent histories of eartesianism jua~ insist that it is iq>ossible to separate Delcartes the
scientist from Descartes the philosopher.
We have said that despite the point Weber makes, Descartes is not a

scientist in the modem senae. The mathematical 8Jll)basis in science

was not symbolic for Descartes,

but rather offered him a reliable

•thod, the rationalistic deductive mat.hod with which to work.

Lindaq

8&pl

.

.

Descartes lived iD times that saw the beg1nn:lng
of modern philosophy and himself' contributed as much
u anyone to those beginning8• Though without the

=

o. Fuller, Histo~ of Philj)S~, f:~S9.
2. Alfred Weber1 His§ri
ffiuosop!V . P• ~;,•

1.. B. A.
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experimental genius of Galileo and forriceW., be far

more than Lord Bacon bad an insight into the theoretical basis upon which the new discoveries rested. Hie
great contribution to science was mathemat1cal. He
was a l ~ more concerned with general principles or
method than wl'th the detailed work ot observation.
His science is essentially rationalistic. Just tor
that reason., his scientific work is tilled with the
most daring prophecies which became the aasumpticma
of nineteenth century science • • • he .mainta1ned
that the universe was a mechanical system and asserted
this of the nature of the human
and the whole
nature of the animals as well as the structure ot the
solar system. Qf late years scientific thought is
becoming conscious of the limitations of this ideal.
It involves certain theoretical impossibilities. But
the serv-lces it has rendered to modern science cannot
be over-cstil:lated.l

bocv,

Perhaps the reason why Descartes as a scientist waa relative'.cy
successi"ul.

\\"0.3

wi-

bis firu belief that science arises troci philosophy.

He himself did no·i want t o build upon foundaticms so infirm. One

woul.d think that ainc0 ha felt philosophy should not be the basis
£or science that he -muld find another basis, . But in this he tail.a

as we shall sea when m approach hie meta~ics-. Ba is still the

rationalist. He still IllU!lt start with a ms~ical principle from
which all knowledge stems. He fails entireq.to see the value of

induction as did Bacon, the value of the hypothesis, and the value
of the empirical test of the Jm>otbesis.

Just for this reason he
.

fails t.o becoae ~ modern scientist. .At. the

.

nm t:linie,

hi& importance

1n the .field oi' theoretical. science, p,s bis importance to tbe science

ot his

01l1l ~ ,

cannot be denied. Northrup iDeludes him in a list

or ecien•ists who proved theaselvea to

be· :such because · tbe7 11ent

beYond the third stago of i.nquiry• . (See page

8.)

An exaro·ination of mjor 1iestern philosopbera shows
, tha~ ~ey .11ere f ~ t rate scientists be.rqre . they became

l. A. D. Lindsay, Introduction to
p. ix.

Everyman

edition of Descartes,
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philosophers~ Uoreover the science 1n which they wre

expert uas always mature~ having reached the t.h1rd
stage of inquiry where deductively dormul.ated theory,
requiring concepts by postulation were introduced.
This is true or I)egocritua• Plato., Aristotle,' Albert.us
Magnus,' Desca1.--tes• Leibniz,' lfant and Alfred Uortb

m:dtehcad to incluaa a contempora.-ey and mntion on:cy,
a few.1

So I think

\iC

can count science· as it

V&B

known 1n the sixteenth

century as one of the profound iru."luences ou Deecartes. & thought

it aut£icientl3 important to give it a prominent place in hie philosophy immedia:l:iely followlng bis proof for his own and Qodts existence.

Another influence

011

Doscartos t philosophy ns his religion.

Rene Descartes was a devout Catholic. However. he did not enjo,- the

favor or the entire church; aa Lin~ puts it.a
T't1e publication of the DISCOullSE made Descartes
famous, but it also, in spite of his previous behaviour,
made him an object of suspicion to the more extrome
ecclesiastics, Calvinist and Roman Catholic alike; It
was p2l""&icularly to ~ these suspicions that he published i n 16Ll his MEDITATIONS ~ • ~ Their purport was
to show t ri. at the new system of philosophy, in spite o!
its fundamental difference from Scho1aa1.icin,. could

produce irrefragaule argwaonts

rem

tbe most orthodox

conclusions.2
Porhaps i·i; wa.s for ti'ds same reason that Descartes wrote at the end

or his PRINCIPLESi
I submit all n-q opinions to the authority or the
church. Lest I should prcfJ\J8! too tarI I attim nothing,
but submit all these r.rJ' opinions to the authority ot the
cbUl"Ch and ·the judgment of tho more sage; I desire no one
to believe anything that I've said, unleaa he is con3
strained to admit it by the torce and evidence of reason.

1. F. s c Northrup The ~ or the Sciences and the Humanities, P• 7.
2.. A.
1ntro"aucllon'"toEver.,man ed!tion o1""1Jeicartea, P• x.
3. Rene Descartes 1 Principles !!!, Pbilosop5t, P• 228.

»: Li.nds3'Y',

Such a statement and tl2llY others which one finds 1n the dedicaticma

seem to indicate a lack or certainty on the part. or Descartes in the
validi!,Y of hi~ system.

This io .n ot nec~asarily the case• howner.

He TIJJJ:f havo been protecting himself.

.The

never denied

£act is he
. .

the pr-lnciples he laid clmm even thougl1 be often ran into dif'ficulty-.

Descortes
made.

tl3S

not of the ·stu.i'f that martyrs are

1i01"'8over he had a deep and sincere devotion

to t he church· and respect ior its authority. Its
condemnation was enough to &111'9 bis conviction of
the truth of his conclusions.

Descart.Gs• £ear of the hostility of the Church could not but innuence
bis thought.

This .rear perhaps accounts tor ):ds al.moat absolut.e

dual 1sm of bocy and mtter. Lindsay suggests &

Hobbes had snid, •It is ldth the mysteries or
our religion as with wholesome pills for the sick•
which s\l<lllowed 1~hole have the virtue 0£ cure J bu.t
chewed ars for the most part cast up without ett'ect. •

Descartes had never thought .or chewiDg or 1n
any va,.y ana.]Jrsing tihat his spiritual doctors prescribod-. He was concerned to prove that such spiritual proscriotiona wre necessary, and to just1ty
that view oi the world on which they are basod. This
was the source of Descartes• dualism. He bad to find
room in his system for two entire'.cy' disparate worlds.
He never really gave any explanation ot their connection e:tcept to s~ t."lat thoy ·~re both tbore and that
their inter-comr;nmication was m.raculous. The sharp
·separation \lbich he I!IDintainc-d botwaen them ~
e ~ banurul to both. It pr~ced on1 the m.9.~
bis conception o£ a pure'.cy' meeball.i.cal world which is
the basis for modern materialism, and on the other
band the beg-lnnings or that form of idealism 1lbich
shuts the soul up within itself and tends to tbrolf
doubt upon and even deny the existence o.r tbe external
world of objects. For the soul conceived of as separate from the body there can be no object but itself,
or ot a God separate from the world. flle soul•s
lmowledge of the world ~comes a 11\YBter.Y which it is
~

to go on believing.-

1. Lindsay, !?l?.• cit., P• ix.
2. ~ - , p.-13.-

lS
Thus cartesian dualism rises from bis mutual interest 1n both science
and religion and bis desire to establish the vallditq

ot both. We

shall deal core f'u11y with Cartesian dua)i sm in the conclusion ot this

paper for it is integral in Descartes• quest far certainty. In any

case:
Descartes vas a practical Catholic all ot his
life and he tried to develop proof's or tho existence
ot God, an explanation of the Eucbarist,. ot the
nature of religious faith, and or the operation ot
diV'lne provldence'
his pbilosophy as a basis
for a new theology.

ring

What else need be said about Descartes the man? We have invast.i-

gated those interests and influences wbich moulded bis philosophy.
Jlatbecatics, science, religionl These

1181'8

the three great branchea

of learning that Descartes tried to synthesize and clarity 1n h1a
philosophy.

By doing so, he hoped

to lead the world tram the chaoa

and doubt into which it bad been led by Scholasticiam and establish

for it a structure as well grounded as a geometric axiom upon which
might be erected the superstructure o£ a new thought.

l. Vernon J. Bourke, "Cartesianism, • Dictionary 2! Pbiloaopby,
(Runes), P• 46.
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III. The Cartesian Quest tor Certainty
Descartes enters upon his pb1Jos'o pbic speculation 1rith an air

or modesty.

nAi'ter

all,"

he says, •it

'l1Jlf1'

be possible that I am.

mistaken and it is but a little copper and glass, perhaps, that I
take

tor go-ld and diamonds. •1

He asserts that be is not offering

an object-ive answer to the problems be attempts to solve. He rather
affirms his subjective approach,
By present design is not to teach the method
which each ought to follow tor the right conduct
of his reason,. but solely to describe the R1' 1n
which -I have sought to conduct rq om ••• tb1a
tract is put forth mere~ as a history,. or if you
11ill, as a tale, in which, amid some eUJll)lea
worthy of imitation, there will be found, perbapa, 2
aa many more which -i t nre advieable not to,tollos.

ife have alreaey mentioned how Descartes til"ed of the studies

taught in his early Jesuitical surroundiDgs. One by one he exam1ned
the various subjects tor study and 11tbe varied courses and pursuits

of mankind at large,a and found scarcel;y one which did not appear
vain and useless.

He writes i

I f'ound ~elf involved in doubts and errors,.

that I was convinced that I had advanced no further
in all 'fiIJ/ attempts at learning than the discovery
at every tum or 'I!fi' om ignorance ••• I was thus
led to take the liberty of judging all Jl8ll by 11qae1t,. and of concluding that there was no science
tn ezistenee that was ot such a ~Jture as I bad
previoUB~ been given to believe.

<me. is reminded in this· doubt of Deseartes, or Bacon's categorisation
of all the things llbich mq be doubted under biS

l.
2.

Rene Descartes, Discourse ~ Method, P•

Ibid.
3. ?6Icl.

-

tour idola.

S.

Each
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stands for cei--tain popular misconceptions or beliefs 11bich muat
conscious]¥ be denied bofore truth can be achieved.

Ona sees a

trace or tbis in Descartes,
I learned to entertain too decidedJ¥ a belief'

in regard to nothing or the truth of which I bad
been persuaded oeroly by example and eu.stomJ and

thus, I ~icated 1JJ3Self from ~ ·erroz-a po119rful
enough to darken our natural indulgence, and 1Dcapaei1ite us in a great measure trm llsten1ng to

reason.

Descartes wants to eJ:iminate these errors.

Ha tells how he &111818

•had an earnest desire to lmow how to distinguish true fraa false.•

He tells us that this intense drive within h1a in addition to the

feeling of in.adequacy l1ith which his various st.udies bad left him,
prompted him to seek other recouroe~
For those reasons, as soon as ur:, age pemit~d
m to pass from t.he control ot my instructors, I
entire'.cy' abandoned the otu(\y of letters, and resolved not to se.::k any other s~d;y than Jl\YSGlr, or
of the great book of the 110Z'ld.
.

•

The subjects of studies t.hus far bad~ served to teach him

habits of t,h~t and ideas which bad not been prawn.

have these ideas smp~ because •

1'81"8 brought

In tact,

118

up 1n an enviroDmBDt

of llbicb these ideas are a natural part,.. 1'herefore .he reels w would
have been much better otr if-..

1181"8

born 111th our intelligence· tul.:q

matured. We would thereby not be subject to the custams and folkways
of thougbir that so color our thinking. We ·IIOUl.d not t.heD be bound by
•the chains forged by the free men of yesterda.Y• •

In v1n of all

this a Descartes makes a deciaion which is tbe starting point of his

quest for certaintys
l. Rene I>es-ca1~s, Discourse ,gg Met.hod, P• 9.
2. ~ . , P• 8'!'
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•

. ..

As for: the opinions ·I had up to that time ea-,
braced, I thought I could not do better than to re-

solve to s~ep them wholly away, that I might afterwards be in a position to admit either others more
correct, or even perhaps the same when they llad
undergone the scrutiny 0£ reason..l

At another place he

~31

I was thus lee! to infer that the ground tor
our opinions is fnr I:JOre custoci than any certain
knowle~oe • • • I could select from the crowd no
one whose opinions seemed worthy ot preterence,
and I thus found ~elf constrained, as it Wl'9
to use ey ow11 reason in the conduct ot 'f!13' lli'e.!

In order to facilitate this method ot doubt he takes a

i"urther

step in desiring that all those things 11b1ch are cloubttul should be

considered false. 3 In doing this he makes a conac1oua ettort to

eJ1:rdnate from his mind all extran&oua materiAll and thua imnD'e a
clear mind for tbe .foundation llhich must then appe,ar as indubitable.
He sap,

I am constrained to avow that there iB nothing
at all that I formerly believed to be true ot which
it is mpossible to doubt and that not through
thoughtlessness or levity', but from cogent and

mature~ considered reasons; so that hence£o~
if I desire to discover an;ytbing certain,,. I ought
not the less refrain fro:ri conse11ting to those same
opini~s tlWl llhat mgbt be shown to be manitea~
talse.4
Thus he adopts a positive method of dc,.ibt applied to all things 1n

t.he search for truth.
Descartes cautions his reader that ·:;bis mthod of doubt should

onl.1' be used in the contecplation of

trutbJ

it 1a

dangerous to

appq

it. to the practicalr,problems o r ~ lite. Hor doea he want to be
charged with scepticism.

l.. Bene Descartes, Discourse !!! Method, P• 12.
2. Ibid., P• 1.4.
3. 'S'iie Descartes, Princie; P• l.6S.

L.

Bene Descartes,

lidlG

,

P• 8)•
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I made it fiI3' business in each matter to renectparticularly on lfl1at might be d9Ubted and ·pr<mt a
source oi' error. I gradual Jy rooted trora rq mind
all error. which bad hitherto crept into it. Not
that in this I imitated the sceptica who doubt on]3
that they may doubt, and seek nothing beyond certainty
itseli'; for on tho contrai7, ~ design "AS to rind
ground

for assurance, and I cast aside the loose cl.ay

and sand, that I might reach the rock c,r clay. In
't;hia it appeare to me that I was successful. enougb.l
With the descrip~'.ion or hi8 syatema.tic ottorta to doubt, Descartes
begins one of the most absorbing and intriguing studies in phi].oaophic

literature.

lie proceeds to can-y bia plan into action, that is to

doubt all that he has former~ thought to be true. In the first place,

he found that he could doubt his sense experiences
All that I have up to this moment accepted as

or the highest truth and certainty, I
received eithei" frooi or through '1111' sense. I observed however that these sometimes misled •J and
it is the part or prudence not to place absolute
confidence in that by which we have e't'er been depossessed

ceived.2
He is i\lr-lihe~ convi..nced

or

the deception ot his senses by bis ex-

periences in sleep.:
But ! cannot f 01"get that at other tiiles I have
been deceived in sleep by eMilar illusions; and
attentively conBiderine these cases, I perceive so
cle~:cy that there exist no certain iJarks by which
the state of valdna can ever be distinguished fran
that of sleep, that I feel great]3' astonishedJ and
in amazement.,. I al.roost persuade ~lf' that I am
now ~-rig.3 ·

However, even while dreaming

"fMi1'

seem to invalidate sense mcper-

ience, Descartes sees some possibility of reta1nine

the validity of

our sense experience, even despite the dream argument• . For be 8 8-Y8 1
1. Rene Descartes, Discourse on llet.hoc:l, P• 23.
2. Rene Descartes, Miidltatlona, P• Bo.

3. ~ . , P• 81.
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Nevertheless., it tniat be admitted that the objects
which ·a ppear to us in sleep are, as it were, painted
representations of real objects which could not h&'fll
been formed unlesR in the likeness ot realit1esJ and

that therefore those general objecta at all e~ta eyes., a head, bands, and entire~ - are not simply
imaginary bu·& really existent • • • For whether I am
awake or dreaning1 it re?:lains true that two and three
:!lake £ive, and tlm t a square has four sides; nor does
it seoa possible that truths so apparent can ever fa11
under suspicion of falaity (or incertitude).l
So Descartes con·tinues in his attempt to see it it is possible justly

to doubt sensible experience:
As I s o:uetiues t hink that others are 1D error respecting matters of llbich they believe themselws certain

and to possess a perfect knowledge, how do I know tbat I
am not also decei vod every time I add together two and

three., or number tha sidos of a squnre, or form some
judgment still more simple, if more siJuple can indeed
be i.naeined • • • I vil1 suppose then not that Deity who
is sovereignly good and the fountain of truth, but that
some malignant demon who is at once potent and deceitf'ul.1
has en;,loyed all of his artifice to deceive meJ I w1ll.
suppose that the sky, the air I the eart.h, colors• figures,
sounds, and all enternal things are notbing better than
illusions or dreams, by means of wbicb this demon bas laid
snares on my credulity; I will consider ~alt as llithout
hands• eyes, flesh and blood or any ot the senses, and as
falsely beli eving that I am possessed ot theseJ I will
continue resolutely £ixed in this beliet and it by this
means it be not in my powor to arrive at a knowledge of
truth• I shall at least do what is in -eq pomrt< vis ••
SU8pend judgment, and £,'Uar<i with settled purpoae against
giving UI1f consent to dla.t is false, and boing 1mposed
upon by the deeei ver, whatever be his power and artifice. 2
Up

to now he

has i'elt

that matb.ematical. truths are indubitable.

But in bis search for things to doubt, Descartes tells us that even

mathematical . demonstrations fall beneath the same arguments which he

'USed to doubt sensible thingsa
We 'llill also doubt of the other thing we haw previous~ held to be certain, even of the demonStrations
.or •thematics, and ot their l)l'inciplsa which we have
bitherto deemed self evident.)

l. Rene Descartes,. Hedi.tations, PP• 80-81.
2-. Ibid., PP• 82-84.
166
J. &iii· Descartes, Principles ,2! PbilosoPbf., P•
•
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It would seem that at this point, Descartes baa reached the cl.1max
ot doubt.

Here he has achieved t.he ultimate 1n acept1c1am, tor he

bas doubted the validity of mathematical demonstrations.

(Recent

use of non-Euclidean geometries especially in connection w1th new

spatial concepts bears out what Descartes meant by the necesaifiT

tor doubt.)
Descartes f ~ affirms that at leaat when wo have doubted
all, l'lhat reaains will still be· absolutely certain, for it has with-

stood the ultimate test.1 Furthermore, the whole investigation, the

entire experiment in the test of all experience with the sceptical
attitude of mind, had yielded certain fruits. Descartes tella us
sanething of these f ruitsc

Since I endeavored to discover the falsehood. or
certitude of the proposition I examined, not by feeble
conjectures, but by clear and certain reasonings, I
met wlth nothing so doubtrul as to not yield a conclusion of adequate certainty, although this wre mere]¥
the inference, that the matter in question contained
nothing certain ••• In destroying such of '61T opinions
as appeared ill-founded, I made a variety ot observations and acquired an amount of experience of which I 2
availed t.J7Self in the establishment of the more certain.
And so Descartes, while he bas gained valuable experience, and a
feeling that sooe or his infonaation may be valid (that is it he is

not being deveived by an evil demon},. he nonetheless is taced 111th
the inevitable conclusion, that there is nothing certain, except,

perhaps, that he doubts.
I supposed accordinglyt that all the things which
I see are false (fictitious JJ I believe that none of
the objects llbicb rif:/' fallacious memory repre98nts ever
l. Rene Descartes, Discourse ~ Wethod,-, P• 73.
2. ~ . , P• 24.
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m.stedJ I suppose that I posaess no BenNBJ I beline
that bo~., figure, extension, motion and place are
mere]¥ fictions or my mind. What 1s there then i\bat
can be estetmed true? Perbape tb18 . oaq, that then
18 nothing absolutely certain.1
And so Descartes I quest tor certainty ends

uncertainty&
1. Rene Descartes., Meditations, P• OS.

OJU1' 1n the certainty ot
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IV. Certainty tram Uncertainty

It is t;ypicil of this uncanny Frenchman to find bis certainty
rooted in

the idea of uncertainty. But this is•

after

ill• no more

unusual t.han his deliberate attack on all things considered tixed
.

.

and cortain by t be popular mind. De3carws es-tablisbed t.hia idea

as a fixed and inGvltable equation - by bis doubting, be is assured

o£ his own existence. Descartes sayaa

I had t he perauaaion that there was· absolute~
nothing in the world., that there "ft8· no sk;y or eart.h.,
no mind or bodies; was I not at the same J:lC1181lt ))81'suaded that ! did not exist? Far trom 1tJ I assuredly
existed since I ns persuaded. But there 1s I know
not what being possessed ot the greatest power and
cunning, who is doubtless employing all his ingenuity
to deweive me. Doubtless then, I .mdet since I •
deceived; and let him deceive me as he ma,;y, he can
never vr-'l..ng it about that I am nothing so long u I
am conscious that I am something. Sot.bat it mwst
be maintained., in fine, all things being - ~
and carefully considered that this propositiCID I am,
I exist., is ne~essari'.cy true each time I conceive

it in

my mind.1.

Vie find a sitailar statement in the Discourse but with a better anal3ais

or how assurance is derived !"rau the necessity of the th:Jnk:Jng or
doubting process - the idea being that the fact ot thought or doubt

establishes the necessar:, existence

oi the

thinker or doubter, subject

and action being synorzymous and aitual'.cy necessary•

I thought that I ought to reject as absolute~
false,, all opinions in rogard to which I could suppose
the 1-east ground frC1J1 doubt, in order to ascertain
whether after that there reEJa1Dad ought in 'llfl belief
that was wholly indubitable. 4ccording~, seeing that
l. Rene Descartes., Meditat1omr, p.. 86.

our sense sometimes deceives us,- I was w1U1ng to
suppose that there existed nothing rea].q such u
they presented to us J and because some men err 1n
their reasonings and fall int<> paralogisms, even
on the simplest matters ot ge0Cl8try, I convinced
that I was .as open to error a s ~ ' rejected as
false all the 1~asoninga I had hitherto taken aa
demonstrations; and f ~ , . when I considered that
the ver;r same thoughts {presentations) that bad
ever entered T1I',{ mind llhen awake, bad in them no
more truth than the illusions of -rq dreams. But
ilrcediately, I observed that, whilst I this ld.shed
to think of all as false, it 'W88 absolute'.cy necessary that I tmo thus thought,. should BE, somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think,
therefore I am, was so certain &l)d of such evidence,
that no ground of doubt, however ·extravagant could
be alleged by the skeptics capable of 8baldng it.
I conc1uded that I could, without scropJ.e, accept

as the first principle of the pbiloaophy ot which
I was in sel\l"eh.l
Later on Descartes describes this assurance

JIOl"9

accurate]ya

In the words, •I think, tbere&>re I am•, 'there

is nothing at ·all which gives Iile assurance beyond
this, that I see very clearly that in order to think
it is necessary to ezist; I concluded that 'l might
take tor a general rule, the priilcip1' that all
things which we clearly and distinctq conceiw are
true, only observing h011&ver, that there is same
di.f'.fieulty in righ~ determining the objects which
we clearly conceive.
Furtb.e?'.filore, we have noted in the car~.:';J)ages of this paper how
the form of our questions and our presuppositions may influence tbe

alternatives we allow ourselves in the analysis of some aspect or the
problem o£ truth. We 1dll note here that Descartes, who was a great

theoretical scientist, by trying to eliro:biate from bis mind all presuppositions (idols), is forced to find the source ot assurance in

hisnown consciousness. So be arrives at the •Cogito, ergo sum.•

1. Rene Descartes, Discourse !!! »etbod, PP• 26-27.
2~ Ibid• ., P• 27.

2S
His presuppositions, that the existence of matter is doubttul,

etc., are of such a nature as to incline his pbiloaopby 1n the directi~
of idealism rather than a dual1 sm.

'lh1s. ·general

sophy 1s faeilit.ated by the "Cogito, ergo sum..•

tendency in h1s philo-

In tact, it is in his

'

exposition of the "Cogito, ergo sumn that he approaches lll08t closely
this idealistic school; and it is in this direction, he reels, that

.

'

certainty lies. As a result, •he is extrem~ interested in the nature
of mind. He affi:nns repeatedJ.¥ that

118

are much more ·certain of the

existence ·of the mind than of the existence of the bocb'a
And this is the best mode or discovering the nature
of the mind and its distinctness from the bod;ya £or, examining what we are, while supposi.113 as • now do1 . that
there is nothing really existing apart from my own thought,
we clearly perceive that neither extension, nor atgurej
nor local motion~ nor anything s1m:i]ar that can be attributed to body, pertaina to our nature• am nothing save
thought alone; and consequent]J", tbat the notion we have
of our mind precedes that of 8.fJY corporeal thill!b and is
more certain, seeing• still doubt whether there ia any
b ~ ill ~'d.stenee while we alreadJ pereeiw that•
think • .1.

Since our mind is the chief thing even in the understanding of
the material 1.1orld, it. is true that mind is more

important. But even

further•· the perception of the material world understood by -r:11' mind,
is a token itself, of the md,stence o£ my minds this in refutation of

the· Locldan concept that what is in the mind was first in our sensee.

Perhaps

111e

even find in this refutation of Descartes and other similar

ones. a begirming

or

the Kantian criticism of Locke. lCant sees· the

ultimate nihiliSI:1 of both the Lockian empiricism and Berkeley's subjecti.ve idealism and suggests that while it is true that what is- in

1. Rene · Descartes, Principles., P• 167.
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the mind was first in the sense, still 1t 1~ .equa].q true that the
m1nd is the necessary synthe~c agency~ the organisation

ot the

phenomena presented' to the senses.

Even at his initial stages of inquiry into this phase of the
problem (of' establishing the certain and indubitable), Descartes

still retains his doubt,s about material things. All t.hat· he has

~

'

work with is his thinking and tho corollar;y to that, his existence.

I thinlc.,, therefore I am. It is perhaps even true, he reasom,• that
all _that he needs to insure bis existence IS mind. For he s~a
li'rom the very circumstances that I sought to· doubt
the truth of other things, it mu.st clear~ and certa:lo}y
follow that I was, uhile on the other hand, if I had
only ceased to think, although all the other objects
Which I had ever imagined, had been in realit)T existen~

I -.ould have had no reason to believe that I existed.
I thence concluded that I was a substance whose essence
or nature consists oncy in thinking and llhicb~. that it
may exist, has need or no place,- nor is· dependent on
any matar-lal thincs, so that •1• that 1s to say, t.118
mind by which I am what I am,. is who~ distinct £rem
tl1e body and is even IilOre easily lmown than t.be latter,
and is such, that though the latter }18re not, it would
still continue to be all that it 1s.1.
But does this imply that one exists only when one tbiolcat Descartes
~ t "I aa, I exist;

this · is certain; but how otten7 As often as

I think, f or perhaps it would even happen if I should

to think that I should at the same time ll'h~~ ~

who1J1' cease

·to be. •2'.

We see

then, how si3lrlfieant the consciousness-approach 1a to the philosophy
of Descartes.

Let us observe 001.'"8 in connection Idth our main thesis,

nameq the stuczy- of tW.s man•s pbiJosopey as a ma.tbod

or assurance,

that the inevitable necessity for that assurance 1s grounded in
1. Rene Descartes, Princims, P~ 27.
2. Rene Descartes, Ueclita ons, P• 88.

the
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ego, in bis personal, subjectiw conaeiowmua. "What then aa I?
A th1nldng being it has ~n said. But What 1s a thlnkln« being?

It is a think that doubts, understands (conceivea),

atnrms,

denies,

wUls, refuses~ that imaginea also, and perceiws.•l

This thinldng object has ideas, or course, but those ideas are
not. synonymous ·,vith their objects.

Thia -

see t'ram a passage in

which there is perhaps a bit of the Kantian distinction between

phenomena and noumena: "I have observ8d in a zmml>er of instances,
that th.ere is a great diffe1'8llce between the object and the

idea.

Thus, for ex.m!!ple, :in ffJ3 mind, ,I £ind wholly two dil'£erent ideas
2
.
. .
.
or the sun, etc. 17 or course, Descartes here is talk1ng about an
idea and an object.

Dut since 'the mind (previous~ defined), also

•perceiveon, its iclaa of an object is its percept,iqn ot it. Here,
t.hen, Descartes is distinguishing between au object and our pe~
cept1on of it, without a.ffiradng that• can ever perceive the

object in its entirety.
But the mind very often can perceive mor-J

our ~onses ~ ,,.
thinea

~

frlA

object than

In support o£ the al?ility of the mind to pereeiff

which the sonses misled us,

a pioce or wax.

ot

In placing

Descartes ask8 us to tbiDk of

the wax in proximity of

the fire, ever./

&ensib)e perception,. former]¥ ours, concernine the wax is changed.

lt bas chanl,ed in regard to our sight, hearlllg, smell._ taste and
touch of it..

nan

He concludes, nI ImJSt theref'ore admit that I cannot

CQilprehend by im.gination what the piece

1~ Rene Descartes, Meditatioms, P• 89.
2• ~... P• 99.

ot wax ia and that it
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1a the mind alone uhich perceives it.•l

.Deacat:tes suggests a ~

another example:
(Speaking

or peqple •lk:Jng in

t.be street below).

What do I see from the window beyond bate and ·cl.oaks
that I!Iigh~ cover artificial macbinea whose mot.ions
might be determined by springs. But I judge that
there ax'E> human beines from ~ ~ c e e ., and
tJ.lus I comprehend, b'J the faculty of judgrimlt alone
whic:h is in
eyes. 2

~

$d., what I Qelieve I say with JV'

It is too bad that Deacai"'t ea does not exa:adne the source of the
precepts which

determ:ine the mture of his judgnants. His earnest

desire to separate t he mind f rom raaterial ·things seems

go

to

au exiir ene to deny material tbinr;s, the· objects

experienoo.

or

him

bis sense

It is still true that h1s understanding of wax 1n its

new .form as changed by warmth is still the result

wax.

to make

or experience with

And his judgment tliat those are genuine people in the streets

1s based on experience too, on the many times he bas descended the

stairs and mingled among tl'iem, indeed talked to them• shook hands
.,.,_th theQ, uaed ~s sense of smell to distinguish the fish pedlar

from the aristocrati c debutante. But, I don"t think Descartes is aa

guilty of going to the extreme in dei¢ng the existence ot material
things as he aeems to be.

He is still consciously doubting.

lie is

still intere~ted in absolute aoourance. and certainty• Thus even

though his judgments of the objects ot sense experience are based
on previous experience, it is still true that experience is not
a l ~ true and valid; he

5: be deceiwd. 'l'heretare,

be must dis-

cover .foundations more firm. These foundations he fi.nda in consciow,-

Lt Rene
2.

Descartes, Meditations; PP• 91-92.
p .. 93..

.!2!!!•,
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ws. Tho emphasis is, as I•ve ~aid~ on bis 1dea11ni. But h1a
SdeaJ i am ariaes only because bis COD8ciouanesa 1a harder to doubt

12um material tllinga. But he is still interested 1n validating
sense experience and the material 110rld. Far be points out that
even DlVALID and incorrect sense experience in

its interaction with

bis imagination has sufficient i'orce to establiah his existential

status as a 1"eal being. For he says s
But flnally, Ydlat shall I say or tho milld itsel.r,
that is, of !!zy'Self? for as yot I do not admit tbat I
am anyt.hing but mind. \'Jhat thon1 I who seem to
possess such a diot:lnct i:opression of a piece or ,ru; do I not know ieysell'? both Tlitb grooter truth and
certitude, an d also much more clear~ and distinctly?
Foi• if I judge that a piece of ,rax exists because I
touch it, it assw.-edly follows, much more evidentq,
that I ~elf am or eJd..st. Far it is posoible that
What I see ~ ,. not be wa.1Z, and that I do not poBSeso
even eyea wl th which to sec anything; but it cannot
be that uhen I see, or, which COCl88 to tho samo thing,
llhen I think I see, I IllV'Seli' who think am notbing. So
likewi.ae, :lf I judge that wax exists because I see it,
it will still also follow that I amJ and U 1113 imagmation, or any- other cause whatever it may be, persuades
me or the existence o£ wax, I will still draw the same
conclusion. And l:bat is here 1"81i1Ql"ked of the piece or
wax is applicable to all other thiDga that are azterna1
to me.1

So in the midst of doubt, Descartes locates t.he island

or security

in an assurance o£ his ovm existence. He concludes•·
I find that I am insensibly reverted to the point
I desired; for_, since it is _now manifest to m., that
bodies t,helilSeJ.ves are not proper]¥ preceiwd by the
senaes nor UJ' the faculty or tl:Jo imagination, but by
the intellec·t alone; and since they are not perceived
.a1"'8 seen and touched, but only because
they a..""e unde.""Stood (01• right~ comprehonded by thought)

because they

I refl(iiq discover that there is notlqng more easi~ or
clear~ apprehended than ~ 01ffl mind.2
l.. Rene. Desc~s, lted:1.iiationG,- P• 93.
~.: Ibid., P• 91h
.
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Descartes• first great question bu bean1 Is there an ultimate 1n
knowledge which guaranteea itself? By

~

by el :i m1nating from his thinking processes all

doubting all

ot those

thinea,

th1nga wbich

WERE doubtt'ul, and by drawing th, one valid conclllaion froa the fact

that he doubted, Descartes bas established a principle, which, tar
him, satisi'if)s the 1"'equirements

or both or

these questions. Tbat

principle; . "Cogito, ergo sum1n Wa have shown how this principle
leads to au emphasis on consciousness and idealiat.ic philosophy.
He now proceeds to his second big queetioni Ia this a suitable basis

for a suporstl.-uc'cu.i.~ of knowledgel
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V. Superstructures a Tbe Existence of Ood and Katter
Descartes has affirmed that wbateftr 1e clear in the mind ie true
and correct.

However, he cautiODB us again and again to make sure that

its clarity is as obvious as that of the •Cogito.• In the •Cogito•,
there is an equation between "I think• and •1 am.•

Tbeae two terms

have the same validity as the equation that exist.a between two plus

two and four.

It is possible to form such an equation because •two

plus two0 is nothing more than another form or •.tour•. So •1 think•
equals, implies, inheres in, "I am".
There is the same force in the ontological argument llherein the
existence of God is derived .from our conception of him. It is a
truth, an axiom which the soul perceives prior to reflection.
There are several shades of meaning in Descartes• proofs for
the existence of God.

There is the purely ontological argument

aspect - the proof that a God who is •a being than which a greater
cannot be conceiveda (Anselm) would not be such if be lacked exist.

ence.

This is an argument by definition.

or as Weber points out,

sometimes the emphasis in Descartes is notz
God exists because rrq mind conceiwa himJ but, !ly
reason conceives God because God exists. The true
.foundation of our faith in God is not our conception
of him, - that would be a subjective and weak basis, but God himself, who rev!als bimSelt to us in the .

innate idea of infinity.
I believe we can find both aspects of this proof in Descartes. Surely,

the Prooi" by dei'inition is there, and surely the argument from our
1. Alfred Weber, HistotZ !)! PbilosoA,Y, P• 247.

iDn&te conception of t he infinte is there.

Let

WI

first look at

the argument based on God•s perfection.

This perfection of God as contrasted with the imperfection ot
'

the human being is pointed out by Descartaae 1

From reflocting on the circumstances that I doubted,
and consequently on the cirClJIDStance that 'IV being waa
not wholly perfect (for I clearly saw that it was a
greater perfection to know than to ·doubt), I was led to
inquire, whence I had thought to think ot something more
perfect than. myselfJ and I clearly recognized that I
must hold this notion from some nature that was ill
reality more perfect ••• It but remained that. it was
placed in rue by a nature oore perfect than nu own, and
which even possessed within itself all the perfections
of which I !llc3iY f or.n an ideaJ that is to say, in a
single word, God&l
Descartes gives us some picture

or

his idea of the perfect Gods

Dy the name God I understand a substance infinite,
(eternal, independant• imrautable, all-kncnd.nc, allpoweri'ul, and by which I Iey"selt, and every other thing
that exists, if any such there be, is created. But
the'ae properties are so great and excellent, that the
more at, tentively I consider them, the less I .reel persuaded that tho idea I have or them owes ita origin to
II\Y-8811' alone. And thus, it is absoluteq necessary to
conclude, frOB all that I have before said, that God
exists: £or though the idea or substance be ill uq mind
owing to this, that I •elt am a substance, I shOlll.d
not however, have the idea or an infinite subs~e
seeing that I am a finite be1ng1 unless 1! 1191'8 given
me .b y some substance in reality infinite •.

I clearly perceive that there is more reality in
the infinite substance than in the finite, and therefore that in some way I possess the perception of the
infinite before that of tbe finite, that is, the perception o£ God before that of Iiij'Selt, for how could I
lmow that I doubt, desire., or that something is wanting
in me., and that I am not wbol:cy' pertect, ~ I possessed
no idea or a being more perfect than ~self, b7 ·comparison of which I know the deficiencies ot m:I 01111
nature?3

l. Rene Descartes., Dis~ourse on Uethod, P• 28.
2. Rene Descartes, ?Ieditati~ P• 164.
3~ ~ . 1 PP• 104-105•.
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Of course.,, out of the a.asump.tion

or a

pertect being Descartes

concludes that this will not be a being 'Ibo 1s subject to doubt~
inconstanC'J1 s adness and such lilm 41

Thia 1s concluded rather

naively, because Descartes himseli' would be quite happy to be rid

or such burdens •1 Furthemore, these

unfortunate circumstances

which Descarteo feels should not be ascribed to God are related to
his own dual nature, that or

mnd nnd matter~

"I theretore con-

cluded that it could not be. a perfection of God to be thus
2

pounded of two natures~ n

~

Undsrutanding Ood in this W8¥ insures

bis existence:

I observed that the great certitude which by

coanon consent is accorded to the demonstrations ( or
ge0100try) is f ounded solely on this, that th97 are
clearly conceived in accordance with the rales I have
already laid dowt1. In tho next place I percoived that
there was noth.ine in those demonstratiODS which could

assure m o£ the existence of the object& thus, tor
be giwn., I cl.ear~
perceive that its 't..l1re0 angles are equal to t11> right
angles,. but. I did not on that account perceive arv-tbi?lg l'd1ich could assure me that a triangle oxistedJ
llhile on t he contra...17, recurring to the oxarn::iMtion
of the idea of a perfect being, I round that the
existence of the Being was comprised in the idea in
the same way t.."iat the equality of ~e three angles
to two right angles is compriSed in the idea of a

exaaple, supposing a triangle to

triangle • • • and that consequen~, it is at least
as certain that God eriats (who ia a perfect being)
as any demonstration in geometry can be.3
·
Deacartes asks hi:i!ISelf whether he could exist

wre there no

God.

If he did, he concludes, he would have to derive his axistence from

•omething more imperfect than God since nothing more perfect than
Ood can be imagined. Let us suppose that he himself is the cause ot
l. Rene Descartes Discourse ob Yethod, PP• 28-29•
2
,
• Ibid..• P• 29.

3.

m!•,, PP•

29-.30.

his existence.

But in that case he would be conscious

at no de-

ficiencies for he would have bestowed upon himself _e ver., quality
which he bad any idea and thus, as far as he
woul.d be perfect.

1188

or

able to judge,

1

But perl1aps the being upon whom I am dependant is
n~t ~d, and I have been produced either by JV parents
or by saoo causes less perfect than Deit7. This cannot
bes £or, as I have said., it is p,ri'ectli evident that
the.re must at least be as !!Dlcb reality in the cauae aa
in the effect; and accordingly since I am a thinking
being, and possess within ivself' the idea of God, whatever in t.lie end be the cause of av m.stence., it mw,t

of necessity be admitted that it 1a l.1kewise a tbirudag
being_, and that it possesses in itself all the ideas
and parfec·tions I attribute to Deity. Then it may be
inquirGd nhether tlds cause owes its origin and m.st.ence to itself or to some other cause. For if it be
self-eJdstent, it .follows tram what I haw laid dowo~
that this cause is GodJ tor since it posaesaes the
perfectio11 of selt'-cxistence, it mu.st Uk,ewise without
doubt, have the power of act~ possessing ever.,
ari'cction of which it
the idea, - in ether words
all the perfections I conceive to belong to God. But
it it om its exist.once to another being than itself'•
we demand again., for a similar reason:, wbether 'tbis
second cauae exi~ts of its.e lf' or tbrouch saae other,
until f. om s~"6 to stage, m at l ~ arrive at an
ultimate cause, ,,,hi.ch will be .God.2

nas

You wlll soo hmr subtly Descartes becoaes representative ot the

two ideas about God. That

be exists because He is per!"ect and that

He exists because of our idea ot things greater than ourselves.

It

is wry hard to separate these two ideas in Descartes. Let wr say a

fe-w IIOrd.s now about. the second Cartesian concept ot God, that he re~ Himself' as perfect through implanting certain ideas 1n us.

This idea or God is a remarmble thing. It is not derived tbr<>Ugh

sense ·experience;, it is not a pure production or fiction of the miDd
l.. · Rene Descartes,, Discourse on Hethod. PP•· l.<>6-107 •
2... Rene Descartes., tlad!tatlona, P• iotJ.

JS
since one can neither contribute to nor detract from the conception
as it stands.

The only o~r possible. s ~

God is t hrough i."l."lato idea3 •

By

Dcm3

or

t.hia knowledge

or

means God bad implanted· these

ideas in U3 at creat ion as though the Daark of the flwarkman 1mpreased

on his work. nl God r:mst have fashioned us after His own

likeness,

" Qnd

~"'9

and

that I perceive this Jikenese in which is contained

.the i~a of God. o2

Des~s has not interested himelt· in enmining all of the
arguaents which migbt be adduced in t,he proof

ot Ood•s

existence.

He tella us quite clearly that llhat HAS co~cerned b1m was the proof

which he consider s most valid, that it the necessity

ot his existence

from the f act of the capacity or the fini~ to conceiw the infinite.
He feels .?urther that "there is no ay open to man llhareb;y proofs of
more . suffi cient ce2"tainty can be discovered.•) Hor does he feel that
even his proof is of suff icient worth to msrit the i.lllllediate con-

version of all men.

Thi s ho feels• is not because of arq inherent

fa.J.4C"J in t he proof but ooeause o£ cortain. unfortunate approacbos to

the probleia in t he mind

or the atheist.

All tnat atheists commonl3 allege in favor or the
non-existence of God arise continually i'rom one or the
other o£ these tw things ·: name~, eitbor the ascription
of
affections to Deity, or the undue attribution
in our awn minds · of so much vigour ad ld.sdm tbat we
essay to determine and coq,rehend lib.at God both can and
ought to do; hence all tbat is allepd by ~ · ~
cause us no di£ficulty provided only we keep 1n
br!lllce that our minds mw,t be conaid::1 tWte lhile
Deity is incomprehensible and :lnfillite.

human

1-~---

So the f orce of Descartes• argumant is tbia, that he could not
be the ~ he is he could not have the thoughts he has if God did

'

.

l. Rene Descartes, Meditations, PP• 109-llO.

2. Ibid.
.
3. Rene Descartes Discourse on let.bod, P• 67.
1.
,
.
q. Ibid., P• 73.

-

36
not exist.

This is guaranteed by' the principle that he, though

finite, ia able to concoivo of the unchangeable, the immntable, the

omniscient, the Olilllipotent, the infinite 1n such a manner as could
only happen if his id.ea was conceived innately aa derived £ram God

himself'.

The existence of God proved, and the existence or himself
established, Descartes next demonstrates how the existence ot God

insures the existence of the material universe. Thia is the second

superstructure. The idea of God •1a t.he perpetual refutation ot
Skepticism. al And since God is perfect and not a ma.], gmmt devil,

Descartes may be sure God would not de8'e1ve him as to the existence

or the corporeal world.
But after I have recognized the existence ot God,
and because I have at the same time, recognised the
fact that all things rest upon him and that he is no
decaivar, and in consequence ot that I have judged that
a1l that I conceive cle'1'ly and diatinc~ cannot fail
to be true • • • no opposing reason can be brought
against Iil0 r.hieh should ever make mo call it into
question; and thus I have a true and certain knowl.edge

or it. And this same knowledge extends over all other
things ·that I recollect having formerl,y demonstrated,
as the t,rut.hs of geometry" and others like them • • •
.And t,hus I recognize clear],y THAT THE CERTAINTY AND
TUE TRU'Iil OF ALL KN07iLEOOE DEPEtID UPON THE KNOWLEDGE
ALOME Oli' T"J:!E TRUE GOD: so that before I lmow him I
could not perfectly lmow aeytbing el.S'e. And now that
I lmow him, I have the iooans or acquiring a perfect
knowledge of an infinitude of things• not onq or
those which are in him, BUT AISO OF TlIOOE \1HICH BELONG
TO CORPOREAL NATURE • • • ·2

C8:l"l"Ying along this idea, Descartes 1'811inds us that prior to

t.hia stage ot the argument he bad raised the problem. of dreams•
Material objects sometimes appear in our dreaas with the force or
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nal objects. How are

1f8

to distinguish the real from the ill.uaary?

How are we to establish the ontological reality

ot

the material world?

Descartes answers it in this fashion,
Though men of the highest genius studif tb1a question
as long as they please, I do not believe that tbey will
be able to eiva sufficient reason to l'8IBO'l9 this doubt
unless they presuppose tlle existence or God. For in the
first place even the principle wbich I haw alrea~ t.akBn
as a rule; vl~., that all thins& which 118 clear'.b' and
~stinctly perceive are truej is certain ~ because God
is or exists and io a porfect Deing; and because all that
we possess is der-1ved i'rora Himj whence it rollo,rs t.hat
our ideas or notiow, which tQ the extent ot their cle~
ness and distinctness are real.; and proceed from God; are
to that extent, true ••• But it we did not Jmow that all
tJ1at 1.we possess of the real and true proceeds frcm a pe~
i'ect or infinite being, however clear and distinct our
ideas IJa.Y be, we should have no ground on that account
for t.hc assurance that they possess the pertection of
being

true.l

So with the a£f imo.tion of Ood*s existence and the matence

or

the

material universe, Descartes has begun the superstructure of h:18
meta~ics.

He has advanced confidently, tor he feel.a t.hat his

reason has been his guide.
In summary, we see that Descartes rinds certainty in llis om
consciousness.

Ilia own doubts wre sufficient to establish his

personal existence. God and tho matorial IIOE"ld are deriwd there-

from. However, a part or Descartes• asuurance ot bis awn enstence
is dsrived froo the existence of God.
Having aet up reason

u a clear guide

ror turtber action,

Deacartes can begin dealing with science, or the lan 'llhicb govern
the material universe. This is bis third great spperetructure.
h1a

atu~

ha is just

as interest.ad in certainV as

- ------

1. Rene Descartes Discourse on Kethod, P• 31.

'

be was in en-

In
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deavor:1:ng

to lay the foundations for a aolid ~tapbysics. Here•

however, the

eo~ ~s much ~re

di.tficult. He ill involftd wit.h

natural proce:Jses which must be investigated, con,cemiDg 11hich
~otheaes must be advanced.

Such hypotheses

· retested and perhaps. restated in the light

Descartes, in o·ther

to

words,

11118t be tested and

or new empirical data.

now t1ll'D8 empirical scientist, trying

ferret. out uat,m.-e 's secrets and place upon them the same in-

signia of certainty that he placed upon Ontology. You will notice

that the raetho~ must becoms quite different because of the nature
. of the subject matter. Desca.rt.es • fir st method was one of' introspection. llis second method was that or faith (a faith which preserved his ethical inteerity even wbile doubting all else). 'l'b1a

really isn•t a "met.hod" at

an,

though it takes the place of one

since it pi•ovides subjective certainty 1lhile the search tor objective
certainty still ~oes on. 'lhe third method

next chapterJ

we

have reserved for the

that method concerns itael.t 11:ith the empirical

approach to nature.
Here we IilllBt remember all that

118

baw said about Descartes

the mat.118matician and scientist. Former]3' be bad uauD8d that the
s ~ point of science was philosophy. Ue found upan

mveati-

gation that pbiloaopcy was tar too UD.9table t.o support so lort.y a
Sllper3tractw.--e as science seemed to be. So it is that Descartes
having uoed mathematics,, or at least a mathematical method in
establishing his introspactiw ~nation and nbjective assurance.

now uses mathematics aa th& foundation tor science. So• ot Descartes
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i t ~ be said that he

laip. science upon a

new starting point and

recognized the importance ot that starting point.

llm'9

than did

either Bacon or Locke.
He starts wlth an examination ot geometry and algebra and upon
careful consideration finds them both entireq inadequate. Then,
realizing that a combination of them would be
be combines them.

A study

or the details ot

~

successful,

tbia process is not

possible trl.thin the confines of this paper nor· is it necessary for
the purpose of this paper. Sufficient to a,q that Descartes establishes the existence of nature because

or the existence

of a per-

fect God and t hen proceeds to lay down the detm.led analysis or bmr
further study is to be carried on. Tb1s turtber stud;y is summarized
1n Descartes• four points of m&thod llhich ia briei'q examined and

criticizod in this paper 1n order to show how the carteaian method

of certainty applies in the physical universe.

Jio.

VI.

Criticism and ~ i s ot Descartes• Foor Pointe

We have said that Francis Bacon did not have the 1D81ght into
the place

or matheraatics

in the future structure

Nevertheless, he is one ot the fathers

ot scientific thought.

or induction.

It might be

interesting to compare some extracts from his Aphorina with the four

points or Descartes:
The logic now in use serves rather to gbe stability
and to fix the errors which have their foundation 1n
coIImO?(cy received notions than to help the search after
truth • • • The syllogism consists ot propositions, propositions consist or words, words are symbols of notions.
There.fore i f the notions themselves (11bich is at the root
of the natter) are confused and over-hasti]3 abstracted

rro!:l the f acts, t.here can be no tirumess in the supezstructure. Our only hope lies in true induction • • •
There are aud ean be only two ways ot searching into and
discovering truth.. The one flies trom the senaes and the
particulars to the most general axiOIIIB,- and trail these
principles, the truth of which it takes· tor settled and
immoveable, proceeds to judgment and to the discover-.1 ot
middle axiOL'IS. And this is now in fashion. The other
derives axiOES from the senses aI¥i particulars, rising
by a gradual and unbroken ascent,. so that it arrives at
the moat general axioms last of all. thia is the true
~ but as yet untried • • • axiOIDB ~ and order:q
formed from particulars easily discover the wa:, to new
particulars, and thus render sciences actiw • • • Ona
method alone remains to us J which is aimp~ th181 we must
lead men to the particulars themselves, and their seriea
and order; llhile men on their side BIDSt force tbamfflvea
tor awhile to lay their notions aside and begin to fam-

iliarize themselves with the tacts ••• The idols and
false notions which are now in the poseession ot the human
understanding ••• not only beset men•s minds that truth
can hard47 find entrance, but ewn after entrance is
attained, they will agapln in the very in8tauration ot the
sciences meet and trouble us, unless men being forewarned

•• • .fortify themselves ••• They are IDOU> OF THE
TRIBE • • • IDOLS OF THE CAVE • • • lOOfS OF THE UAR1CET
PLACE • • • IOOIS

Qli'

TIIE THEATER • • •

1. FrancisPllilosophers
Bacon, '*Aphorisms,, Hn¥¥.amnn~ quoted
~ !:!gJ
~ ~
8.
11

:isb

from

_

P•

by

Burtt•

We nmr woul~ li~ ~o look at the tour point.a

or

Deacar.tesa

The · f irs t was, never to accept ~ u true ·
when I did not recognize it clearly to be so. that 1a .
to say, to cle~ :cy. avoid precipitation and prejudice,
and to include in. wy 9Piniona not.bing beyond t.hat
wbich should present i~elf so clearly and
diatinctzy to my ulind that I Qight have no occasion to
doubt it.
The second was, to divide each or the ditficultiea
which I should present into· as ~ portions as poss- .
ible and as should be required tor its better solution.
The ~ d was, to conduct my thoughts in order, by
beginning with the simplest objects, and those JII08t
easy to know, s o as to mount little b,y little, as it by
steps, to t he . most complex knowledge, and ewn assuming
an ~rder among t hese which do not naturally precede one
another .
. And the last .w as' to make everywhere enumarationa
so complete, and s~ys. s9 wide that I should be sure

a,·

of olili.tting nothing.

Upon an initi al l"Oading of these points by Descartes, one perceives

a relationship to the Aphorisms
eim·ilarity.

or Francis Ba~,. al.moat

one or

I£ wo remember the biographical background, however,

and i£ we ret:iember the application of these points to practical
problems we will realize that they are diametri~ opposed.

It is true that both Descartes and Bacon urge us to get all
~ditional concepts and notions out of our ~~ . In the instance

ot Bacon, this is accomplished by empirical.:q

designating the notions,

and by putting the empirical data into the center of one•a conacioua-

neaa. He uses his four idols to accampllab this. Descartes, howewr,
removes traditional beliefs by doubting, an intellectual mt.bod. ~

distinct~ indubitab:i. certain notions wil.lirbe admitted into our
thinking.

Thus

far the negative portion

or ~cartes'

-----

l. Rene Descartes Discourse on Uethod., PP• 15-16.

'

•thod. The

positive po19tion (the four points) begins lfith the bare Jain1nm
of the rationally indubitable and moves from there at.ep

ror

step

to the remainde1" of trust\'Jortl~r knowledge. 'lh1s method is diametrically opposed to that
observable data.

or Bacon, who

inductiveq accumul.atea

Descarte~ rather follows the deductive formal

principle of the oothematiciana. ·l'his is the opinion of Hortbrup.1
For example, in his desire to begin with the siq,leat objects and

proceed to the more complex, Descartes aa;ys:
I had little difficulty in determining with which
objects to commence, for I was alread;y persuaded that
it must be with the simplest and easiest to know and
consi der-J..ng that f rom all those who have hitherto sought
truth in t he s ciences, the mathematicians alone have
been abl e to f ind any demonstrations, tbat ia, any
certain or evl dent reasons, I did not doubt but that
such must have bee n t he rule of their :lnvestigatioms.2

andt
I commenced w.ith the s implest and most general

tru.ths, and that _thus each truth cliacovered was a
rule available in the discover., ot ·subaequent ones.
Nor in this s hall I perhaps appear too vain, it it be
considered that , as the truth on any particular point
is one, moever apprehends )bat truth, Imon all that
on that point can be lmown.
·
We see

Bacon.

bow

close be appears to came to the inductiw method ot

Actually he is not inductive at all. J.ctnaJly his method

1a al.ways the deduction

or

the more complex £raa the simpler and

more ·easily known. We have a glimpse of his rationalistic method
when he s~, aBut the chief ground of 1113' oatistaction with tbia

method• ns the assurance I bad of thereby exercising

1111"

BBASClf in

1. F • Northrup, The Lo ic of the Science& and ~ Huvn1ties, PP•
~. Rene Descartes,
_!!! Uetli&l, P•-,z.
3. ~ . , P• 17•.
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all. matters, if not llith absolute perfection, at least 111.tb the

1
greatest attai.."labJ.e by m.a

('l'be italics· are~.)

11:le cause, ·aa I haw noted,- of this rationaliatic, deductive

interest on the part of Descartes is, of coune, bis own interest
in mat.bematics.

In the midst of Jesuit dogmatic1am and the con-

sequent narrqr, and inadequate approach to things
nature, he had found bis island
and the higher mathematics.

or

or a

problematic

certainty in algebra, , geometr;y,

He bad decided that this was the

foundation £or a "loftier superstructure.•

This view of mathematics is, after a manner, correct, tor
mathematics (because of its facility for symboli~ representing

.

.

'

various aspects of a scientific problem) placed a new emphasis on

theoretical science. However, the value of mathematics is

war

this, that its root hods ore valuable to the scientist. As we

in

have

mntioned be£ore, the method ~ .relative !2, .'!!! problea and · ~

when this ia realized and applied is a i"air aaount
certainty available.

or assurance

and

Too :cethocl ol LBtJ:lemat.ics is dodu.ctiw, the

mthod of science is inductive·, the method in art, llhat shall•

call it1 • • • aesthetically intuitiw?, the method in religion,
that of faith.

Scao novel philosophers have arisen by the confusion

ot mthods. Some philosophers color t.beir philosophies
r.atbod which best suits ~;.r ends inStead

with the

ot recognising the

legit,-

. imacy of each method in its proper 'p lace. Descartes• lliatake was

tbat

or app:cying the mathematical or deductiw met.hod to

or 911p1rical problem. John

Dewey

tel.ls us,

l.. Rene Descartes, Discourse !!! _!fe_tb_od_, P• 18.

tba scientific

Although Descartes defined natural m.stence 88
extension> the classic tradition that anq aeme and
imagination, acong the organs of the mind refer to
physical existence caused hilil to feel bound to otter
justil'ieation £or the doctrine that scientific phenomena can be stated by purely mathematical reaaoning
wlthout need of recourse to experimentation. His
proof £or the existence of God served the purpose ot
justit,fi.ng tm:s application or mathematical conceptions to physics.l

So we have noted. the difference between the Bacon1an indu.ctiw
approach and the Cartesian deductive approach, an approach 11bich
he arrived at through his interest in mathematical method.

But let us take a m.ore careful look at Descartes• mat.hod.

To start w1th doubt is quite legitimate even in the moat modern
scientific circles. Larabee points this out when 1n discussing
doubt, ha sayss

A scientist doubts systematically everything

that goes into his proof. He doubts bis tactsJ be
doubts his hypothesis J and he doubts whether tbey
fit to~ether as t hey do • • • be cannot prove inductive:cy that the grip of any of his hypotheses
upon the fact is absolute; since (1) no human observer is infallible; and (2) no human being's

lalowledge or all the relevant facts about anythinz,
let alone, a command of all their ~
patterns, is demonstrably complete.
and1

Tht:1 sp:JOit, ~f the quest, however, i.s that ot
systematic doubt. The fertility ·of. science seems
to rest on an aggressive skepticiam. The questioning of everything., the suspecting of ever:, alleged
conclusion - such things are not. only encouraged,
but made methodical. concentrate all tbs doubts
on any single lmowledge claim, Cart'Y them tbroagh,
and the results will be devastating • • • !be problea
1s not to £ind an absolute foundation tor arq of our

ballets• but to discover reasons tor rating one
above another • • •. It is the essence of the scientific spirit to doubt in order to kDo1' what to beli9'99 and not for tho sake ot doW)ting. The scientist
combines a porpetual suspicion ot the results of

.

others and his· om, 111th an enhanced confidence 1n ·,
llhat he accepts for the time being, jut becauae
it bas survived testing b7
selt-correct.iw

!13

method of sys~matic doubt.

And the ·Co1umbia Associates state a 11\'ihen. aµ baa been aaid 1n favor

ot skepticism, it r emains clear that Dllr.l must act~ that scae acts

.

are bettm.· than

others,

.

and that some basis

or discrimination mat
.

be used.n2

Even when the method of doubt bas been employed with regard to
..

1

•

'

.

•

a certain problem, ~e same ~thod of doubt i:mat be repeated generation aft.et" ~eneration in order to perpet~ insure one•~ concepts
by postulation, that i~, one's mental constructs, and ·their validity.

For we never lalow i'inaJJy and cosaplete~. Hew facta· conatantq arise.
And new hypotheses and postulations must be constan~ improvised. to

express these facts.
Aa Prof.

Our

mutehead points

atJl?W:lt. of

knowledge 18 conatant.1$ changjng.

out1 ·~owl.edge keeps no better than fish.•

And doubt is the method atill employed to keep a perpetual check on
the validity of our knowledge.

The two schools of thought - Bacon and' Descartes as •
~inted out - have too different approaches to the problc

haw

or doubt.

There are echoes of these two schools in contemporary thought1
Each ( of the authorities on the methods ot logical
inquiry) maintains that at the beginning one· mat clear
one•s mind of traditional beliefs. With Bacon, this
takes the form or specifying the errors of tbs Idols,
characterizing the usual erroneous traditional belle.ts.
With Descartes, it takes the rormmot dOllbting all that
can be doubted. Doubting is also prescribed at tba _
initiation of inquiry by Korris Coben and Earnest Ragel.
and John Dewey. With Morris Cohen and Earnest Hagel
the fora of doubt is aore Bacon1an and elllJ)irical~cal.l3'
character, since they; like Bacon, designate 8_!'I) -.
certain tram.tional forn11 of belief· which are ..o ""

,

l. H. Larabee, Reliable Knowlr~ ~!, 62t627ftlink1ns, P• 21&6.
2. Columbia Associates,

! Qui

_ ,wu,ec ff

_,

"ohn

c:loubte~
Dewy•s doubting 1s pemapa JIOl'9
Cartesian than empirical and Baconian 1n ita fora, ·
since it takes on the positive effort to ·be

akeptical.l

.

.

So

see that Descartes' 100tbod of doubt bu ~ a very real

11e

.

iDtluence on modern science and philosophy.
. In sumnm.ry1 w have noted that (~d perhaps this is the major

.

fallacy in the taet,h od of Descartes as applied to science), Descartes
is rationalistic and mases the signif'icance of the eil;>irical

approach. We have noted in Descartes• favor that bis method of
doubt forws one of t he bases of modern science. We should not

forgot that Descartes' method reminded the acienUat of t.be great

tool to be had in t he application
science.

or mathematics

Let us mention one more criticism

to theoretical

of Descartes• method.

John Dewey io the man who more tlmn arq ot.her points out that
1n the initiation of inquiry is an indeterminate situation.

.

.

It 111

in the ver-~ nature of this indeterminate situation to be questi911able.

That, is, potenti~ questionable. ActualR', it 1s JD9re'.q
I

"uncertain, unsettled and disturbed.• i'bi.s .doubt, Dn8y' ·says,

(!51ci...!!!:. Theoey ~ Inquiry) not

onl.1' exists in a subjec~w

sense but inheres in the very nature of the situation. ltow, when
the illdeteroinate situation bec0iil8S subject to inquiry, it becamBs
wbat Dewey terms, the "problematic situation.• We liDl8t rearnber

tbat the indetermnate situation is not a part of inquiry• but it
IS an indispensable precondition. If

this

is the case. 1Dqu1r)'

does not begin with doubt, nor with the collecting of f&!=ts, nor

1.

47
111th tho projuction of eypotboses, but wit.h the problmatic aituation•

Froa there Dewey proceeds to

~18

statement or the probl8II

and t-ollowo 1rlth other procedures coq>letaq CNtUnea on Borthrup•a

book.

The point bore is that another of Descartes• •ekneeaea 1a

t.hat be fails to realize the implications

or

the problematic situ-

ation. "One LlUSt begin not with f11Cts,. nor with Descartes• deductive reasoning, nor with a hypothesis, but with the problea and
the problemat ic sit.uation, becauoe at the beginning

or

1nqu:iry

tb1s is all t hat one has.al
Of course, wo don• t want

not.withstanding.

In def ense

to underoatimate Descartes,

or

Northrup

Doscartes (always remembering that

bis was an inducti ve xr.athod) we may say three things. First, it
the world :1.s an or der ly place (as science aasmaea, or at least di~

before tho advent of relativity and nuclear p~ics), than it. would
be logical to assume th.at one could start, w:tt.h the bareat R1n1mm

of certain knowledge, and, using the Cartesian method, that

or pro-

ceeding from simple to coaplsx, even experimenting to increase our
knowledge,

118

might be able to determine within a reasonable period

of' time, the nature of our world and perbapa awn
But 118 must Qake an exception here.

•

ot ourselves.

I£ tbe world 1s BOT order~,

WOUld run into great difficulty following this deductiw •tbod.

To criticize Descartes, we might now say that,. uauadng t.bat
the world IS order,,,. we haven't time
J.o,JJ

manner. Problems confront us

-

to J>l'OC89<l 1n a logical

1JDmed1,ately

and sOIDBtimaa tbe1' are

all out 0£ order with the order which logical procedure might
dictate.

Hence., t he import.ance or the problematical situation.
.

.

that even 1t tba

And number three, we must remsmbor
. WERE

..

~r:cy

and even i f • HAD tho time to

world

'

roµ.o,r ou.t.. the

de-

ductive process or Descartes in t.be enadutian ot our 11Drld, w
still are confronted with the enormous~ inadequate too~ both
physical and mechanical which bin~ our ;research. Far aample,

to examine ;the world deductive~
and working toward another.

•ana

starting at aaae po1Dt

In his •tapbyaica, W.. basic point

is the existence of his own. consciouaness, and conseqwmtq,

'lliat would it be in tbe material world? -.. ~ still

h1mael.t.
~$~

ot

the chains of sense experience. ~a have ~t fiw organs

ot perception, and ·t he means fo.,:o

~ tbaa

(Jllicroacope,,

telescope, e t c.) are c omparatively ~centi discoveries and still
very inadequa·i;e f or a thorough job. Is there

!!lJ,Y

phenomena w'.t1ich could serve as a startine point

observable

tar a ·dsductive

scientific pr ogram? I don•t think sol Of course, Descartes
I

•

•

· 1~

·

J1¥1kes the. •cogit o/ ergo sum" the starting po~t tor hie metaJ>lwaics AND his science. But

118

have observe~ and will haw

occaa~on to observe again later what ~at dift~culv re hmi .
making the leap from mind to the obje_c ti~ existence ot matter.

Such leaps would

be

even more plentiful in a ~talq deductiw

approach to nature.
Scientific method was still such a

D81t'

phenCDBD(ll t)Jat

Descartes .failed to perceive it as a possibility• 1111ch less as
the foundation upon whi ch the modern world would bQ1ld its

civilization. As Costello points outs

49
Uodern science beean with thought, not with
obsei1Vation i 1 Galileo,. Doscartes and Hewtan. The
mistalt..-e ot· Descm'tea in trying to apin a tb8oey ot
the universe out of his head was not that be used
thought, but that. be overlooked t.he great variety
of possible alternatives and the weakneas ot the
h¥UW1 mind in i.Illaginine what these alternati'VeO
11ere. These are the factors f18,t malm an empirical

check of•thinking imperative.

But while we make these criticisms

remember that maI\V

or

ot

Descartes, •

the difticulties in hie met.hod arose out

ot a desire for assurttnco and certainty which

coulci

· grounded in a deduetive method sirn:U ar to t.hat
tician.:J.

muat

ot

un1-v be

the m a ~

Had he been mere~ satisfied with a •thod

tor

achieving cer'Gainty rather than certainty itself', he might
havo embarassed h:ilaself from the point of

now ot modern science.

Instead, be ,rould have studied the scientific at.hods
and Bacon and perhaps have aiTived at

solution.

____

never

ot Galileo

a more natural ·and

__ _

happy

l. Harry Todd Costello, aThe Naturalism ot Frederick Woodbridge,•
,__
in Krikorian•s I'lo.turilism and tha Human Spirit, PP• Jlh-315.

VII.

Criticism of Descartes t lletapb;,vsics

Cartesian metaphysics is intimately bound up with existence.
Descartes• object was to find a truth

or an ontological nature llhich

would be verifiable independant of sense experience.

cartesian world into the realm

or thoughtJ

'fb1s places the

it seems to have very

little relation to the real material. world as

1119

know it.

Because

it emanates from the subjective consciousness and because t.ru.t.h tar
the human being is inextricably related to _sense experience the resul.ta

are unreal and t heoretical for all their validity,.

Lindsay points out1

The resolution to ignore the probable •ans, the
ignoring of ·the data or tlle senses, Jlll8D8 that 1lbile
we can get back to the certainty of existence in general, we can have no knowledge ot the individual. For
the real world is conceived of as purely mathematical
and without individnality. It becomes increasing~
difficult to understand not simp~ what is tbe relation
betllleen knowle~1Y0 and perception, but how there is arq
room foT the senses at all.l
Not onl~l does Descartes• subjectivism seem unreal, but because

Cartesian certainty emanates from the subjective sell"-consciowmess.,

we have not only the doubt concerning the serviceability of the semse
but the apparent separation
which

are

or lilind or thought .tram material th1ngs

the objects of sense experience. Matter in space is shut

away fra:i thought and thought is quite tigb~ inclosed within itself'.

Mind seems to thereby become incapable of cmaprebancling 8DY reality
beside itseli'.

1

Despite the subjectiw unity

ot

mind and mat~ in

aeJ.i'-consciousness, the separation seems absolute. unless raiDd ~

l. A. D. Lindsay, Introduction to Eftr.Y1D811 ·edition of Descartes,P• XV111.
.

t.bought should bocome extended or matter should think.

But far

Descartes; tho ciualism is complete. This is to be ta.Jam u a
criticism

or

Descai'tes.

It is true j.

or course,. that Descar1ies solves

t.be problem 1D

There fdUSt be something llb:ich transcends t.be 1.1m1ta

hie om mind.

of that which is self and that 1'bich is outside of selt. lbat, be
ask:B• is the point llhere the subjectiw conac1ouneas J>IIS8U out

into the objecti·11e? The anst.'8r is the connection between the consciousness of self and t he consciousness of God.

It is because God

IS in our minds that we are insured the ontological validity ot the

objects 0£ sense experience.
An additional criticiam of th.18 dualism ia TOiced by Lindsay.
Lindsay f eels that, this dualistic principle 1s baaed on t.be miscon-

ception t hat t he mind knows itself more easily than it knolls objects.
But vbilo t he mind is a p:resuppoaition

or the knolfledge or objects'

objects to be known are e ~ a presupposition of th& uiStence of
mind.- So he .feels tba·t Descartes bas ovenimplitied bis reasoning

in this respect.
Another important phase of Descartes• •tapbys1cs is the •Cogito,
ergo sum.•

The "Cogito, ergo sum•

entb.Jmeme.. It
tact t.hat

198

is not • proposition,

but an

is not as though w conclude our existence £ram the

think.

This 1'0Uld imply the major premiae· tbat •All

1'hich thinks is.• It is rat.her a think knOIID of itself, b7 •aiJIIWt
intuition 0£ the mind..•

The object1oas of

ouaendi,. JmleT,

Beid and ICant arise· from a construing of the statell9nt

88

•

even

proposition

instead

ot an enthymeme. This, incidental.q, that

the two ideu

rise simul.taneous'.cy',. is the guarantee of the princ1p1At. The one
1a inevitably contained in the other.

~s

th?

'll;le fact ot rq t.b1nJdng

Tbe tact or 'lJ13' doubting
eziat.ence or me. For it 1a

existence or me, the thinker,.

(even 'ff'{/ own existence.) insures the
etUl UY doubting, UY thinking.

This is also the source of Descartes' certainty, a certainty
'

which ~e is able to maintain despite ~e DlliDY errors

~t

judgment

and thinking which man is heir to. Because the 11ill 1s ot ·greater

extension than the understanding, it sometms· gets Ollt of bounds,
so to speak.

We easily carry it beyond the objecta llhich

118

clear'.cy

'

perceive and are often deceived.. '1'base errors are not to be imputed

to God since they lie inheront in our finite nature. To err is hwlan.
However, Deacai"tes maintains tbe i"reedom. of man in all his actions•

Thus error becomes a defect in hia mnner of acting• not in his

nature. But in our clear intuitions, we

do

not err. Thus, despite

error, the £-Tounds for certainty can still be preserved, for the

c18arest of Cartesian intuit1ons is t.bat I exist.
There is one more thought in this connection wbich I should

like to add.

Again

it has to do with Descartes' separation of

t.hought and nature. Niebuhr j>Oints outs·.

Descartes, the fountain soarce ot moc1arD culture,
manages to conceivu ot man pure~ in t.ems of tbought~nature in terms of. machanieftf and to find no organic
unity between the two, thus beariDg within himNlf'
1
both the contradictions and extravagances, or aoderniV•
°'1t oE this dualism comes the •ego• llhich is n~

l.. R. Niebuhr, !1!!, Nature _2! Kan• P• 20.

•teriall3 related

SJ
to the universe. The question arises as to hos thoughts are
derived in the ego, or mind. Hume says that Descartes at tb1a
point is mistaken for he overlooks the importance
caption.

ot same~

Perhaps it, would be simplsst to give ;you Niebohr•e

exarniuation of this objection verbatim,
"When I enter most intimately into· what I
call myself I alua.ys stUiilble on some particular

perception or other, or heat or cold, light or
shade, pain or pleasure. I can never catch Jlij"self at any t-l ne without a porception and can
never obse:i."VG arzyt,hing but a perception.• (Hume
Treatise E!! HUlil&l Mature, Vol. I, Part IV, Oh.
This observation oay be regarded as a valid
eriticiam of Descartes t conception of the pore
ego vmich subsists within itself without relations.
The ~: o is always the center of relations 110 that
it is porfectzy correct to observe,. •I do not
ca~h IJ\YSeli' without a percertion.• But Hume's .
final conclusion, "and carmot observe anything
but a perception•, is obviously not a logical
deduction from the f'or!!l9r observationJ nor is it
according to the £nets. Yet even if Hume were
correct in his interpretation of the eq>irical
ego as a stream of impressions it would still be
pertinent to inquire into the nature of the •v

t)

which he implies when he s~, "When I enter JDOSt
intit:iately into what I call J!G'S8li'. 1 It 1s the

reality of ·the "I" as subject which challenges
the validity of
pure]3 empirical interpretations of the ego.

8i1

Despite ?Jiebuhr•s criticism

or Hume,

it remains one of Descartes•

great fallacies that in trying to achieve certainty he thereby
eliminates the data of sense experience. We haw sho1111 with
Lindsay that t,h:ls makes his world unreal and his proof excellent

metaphysics but not too practical, and with Niebuhr and Hume that

tor certainty.
l.

R. Niebuhr, ,!!!! Nature !!£_ ,!!!, P• 286.

54
Hq I add one more

.tootnote. I Wnk it

1a 1nt.arwt1ag

to /

noi. t.bat Barth in his tret\tment ot the epiat.emological probla
rejects the Cartesian maxim •cogito, ergo

•Oogit.Q.r, ergo sum. 0

BUil•

and subeU.tutu

He holds that th~ knowledge ot selt ia de-

pendent on our lmowledge of God. Aa a bel18'f8r, man is wholly the
resul.t or the object of faith-God. Hence, being

mown, he 1a.

\lhile this I think bas veey valid implic~tions for t be Christian,
I e.on•t

think

it \YOuld satisfy Des~a• quest tor. certainty. In

.

the case of Descartes• propos.ition,_, t.he strength ot ~be proposition
rests on the equation or the two terms.. There ia no such equation

established bet"fA'.3en "Cogitor" and •sum•, the relation
faith.

bein$

one ot

•cogitor, ergo sum• s ~ to be, dom.nan~ 81'llogiat1c.

Thus it defeats the pun>()Se of Descartes' proposition, to whit,

certainty.

The equation of_nu being with JV thinking makes rrq

being indubitable since even the thought which doubts it uists

as something UDi.qu.ely w:, own, or•

m1.

In the cue

guarantee of my existence rests ou.tside. ot •
of my reality illocal..

ot Barth, the

and makes the nature

This footnote at least has served the

purpose of turning our attention to, our nut problem, Descartes ·
and his proof for God.

For Descartes, the finite being is. indetini~ bound up with

the inf'ini.te.
have~

This is not simp'.cy 0%18

or the UIIJZ'IY ideas

llhich

It is the idea which is essential to_our existence

thinJdne beings.

119

88

Nor is the idea ot God a negative idea for

Descartes, an, idea arrived at ttirough the negation o£ the finite•

. .

ss
Aa the concept of "darlmess" impllea •light.,• and as "broacP blpUea

•narrow,•
ot

so "finite," implies

God would

•rnr1n1te.•

come about through the logical

Int.hat way our lmowledge
dedllction tram

the know-

ledge o£ our om limitations.
Rather, Descartes feels that the inf'inite is much JI01"8 real tor
.
.
him than the f inite. This knowledge of the infinite 1s in &OIIB

sense, evon prior to the notion of the finite. How else, he a.alma
110lll.d he be conscious of his own defects. The conaciowm.ess ot a

defective nature cannot give rise to the idea ot infinite perfection,
but rather presupposes

it. If we did not have

the conaciouanesa

ot

ourselves as finite in relation to the 1ntinite, either w would not
be cognizant of ourselves at all, or we would be conscious

ot our-

selves as infinite. Because we are conscious ot ooraelws as finite,
119 a.re

conscious of the infinite. Descartes• principle is that to be

conscious of limit is to transcend it.

In putting bis case in this way, Descartes bas uda the knowledge

ot

God antecedant to his first principle, •Cogito, ergo sum.•

For it

the knowledge of God is antecedant to the idea ot sel.t, lmcnrledge must
begin where existence begins - with God.

Descartes tries to refute

this ar&rument by pointing- out that be must insure bis aelf'-knowledge
and

his knoll'J.edge of the objects

or sense experience b.r the Jmowlec:fee

that God is not deceittlll but true. This ot coarse

does not

satis-

tactorily answer the argumnt in a valid fashion.

.d

However, Descartes has this point ill b1S taTOr~ for what Descartes

ia

reaJ.4r expressing

is that beneath and

all particular trut,ha

lies the great general truth ot the unit, ot thought and exi&tence•.

•
!be ultimate ansl'.er to any attack upon an upect, ot t.rut.h 1a to
dmaut.rate that tbe wry possibUity ot arri.Ying at truth 1a in-

volved in it.

To doubt this argwpent, 1a to doubt reuon itllelt•

and ·c onsequently the

true God. This contributes to

Deecartes • de-

1

fense by affir'~ that tlle consciousness. or aelt 1a not at first
seen to rest on ·ohe consciousness ot God• but that 11ben w aee what

it means we realize tba.t there it llUST reat. It this 1a the case,
then something oust be added to the consciousness of salt as the
first principle - it can

oncy be that 118

understand it in a sense

in 'llhieh ·the consciousness 0£ se.lf is synon;ymous with the conscious-

ness of God.

And I think this can be achieved llithin the realm

ot

cartesian philosophy.
Even however with the establishment

or God aa

tbe neceasa17

link bet118en thoueht and being, bet1'88!1 mind and matter, between

ideas and the objects of sense experience, Descartes repeatedq
falls back into the old dualism. And ewn if •

allow Deacartes

that unity (established by God), w must aak, what kind of unity?
IIIU"eq

generic?· or is it concrete in which the particular elemnta

are subordinated but included.

Tbese are questions for which -

have no definite ans1ers.
In considering the place of God in Cartesian philosophy, •
dare not overlook t he ontological argument. This bas alre&c:\1 been

stated in a provlous cbapter.. It would
IIIBallS

seem that tJl81'8

is no rational

or proving the existen'Ce of God. The cosmological and

teleological proofs have been

examined in JJlllJ1' tGtboOks

the

on pbilo-

Bopby and the philosophy of religion. In same circlea tb61 are

S7
maintained with considerable energy.

In tbe ajority ot cuee.

boawr• they are discredited. So is the ontological argwut.
This proof holds that ~he existence of God 18 iJll>lied 1n His

very nature.

Being the concept of a perfect being, a being than

which a greater cannot be conceived, 1 t would be nanseue to

to such a

being existence, a necessary attribute

deJJ7

or perrection.

In doi"ining God as "realO we again must allow for bia aistence
which is a necessm,y implication 0£ or inference baa reality.

According to Kant. i t is impossible to' prove the enstence ot Oocl

mere:cy by daf ini tion.

1

As rjead points ~ta

It is quite true that the concept .of a ncmx:lstent
God may be logicalzy' self'-contradictory, and that we
1DaY' not be o.b le to eonceivo of such a Boi.J:lg except aa
existing, but 'i.here is all the difference in the world
between declaring that God cannot be · conceived except
as existing., and declaring that because., must Wnk
ot Hin i n terms of existence, He must therefore exist
independant of our conception •. • • For exmple, if we
de£ine a c-lrcle as a nclosed plane curve, all points

or which are equidistant tram the center.," it necesaariq follows that the radii of the circle must be of
equal length. It does not therefore follow that
circ~a !JUST exist inclependant of our conception of
them.

Or as Fuller points out, •The logical necessity- of a self-consistent

idea cannot be translated into the logical necessity

ot

the existence

of an object corresponding to that idea•• 3

Descartes• idea is perhaps a little ditterent. Because ,q

reason conceives Him• God axiats. He exists because ot '1111 per-

ception

or

infinity whieh coul~ not be aaidst ~ .1!31owledge

or rq

detects unless innately placed there by God. Bot 1mo1r1ng any

own cauae. But

detect• I woul.d either be God, or at least

Jiff

1n this ar~nt~ the ontological. proof i8

invo~ftd. ·

9'1811

· Through the' existooce of God, Descartes bas eatabli•bed the

validity of himseli'~ of t."ie mat5rial world, or thought. Burtt

remarksa
Starting nth the indubitable C8Z"t.ainty or the
thinking self~ and using arguments a1ndl•r·to &Olllt
of those emphasized by Augustine and Themas, be tablishes the r~al.ity of a divine being suprem1 in
goodness and perfection. But ~uch a being sure]i
would not place h:J.s creatures under the control ot
a· basic deception tbat would rerider their cleanst
·knowledge illusory. Hence mathematics and mathemar
tica.l physics gain the certainty which Descartes
demanded fol" them, but they gain it lFJ becoming·
grol!iltled ~ t he theolocical metapb3aics o£ Catholic

traditi on.
· Wo see n01II', · I think, the subtle combination ot the forces 1D
the age

or

Descartes which . brought their influence to plq upon him•.

He is in a sense a scholastic and yet be is

the

tat.her ot 11111ch ot

our contemporar,r scientific thihking. In the t~a ot the spirit
he brings the forces of rational deduction to prove the aistence

of OodJ 1n the ~ ot nature, having e~tabliehed their a:iatential.
status• he brings into play· a method of doabt which is still a basis
for modern research.

In his metapeysics be is charllling and naive,

.
in his math~~tics he is brilllant and propbatic. He is a great
~

.apostle of cEu_....ainty. He showed tlle .w,rld more than 1181V' another

man how illusive is the quest.

S9

VIII. Chr"lst:tan Assuranco and Descartes
Upcpei.mJa1W

It is quitie true that the existence ot God is to
be believed S·:i.nco it is taught in the Sacred Script.urea
and that,,. on the other band, the Sacred Scriptures are
to be believed because they come i'roe God (for aince
faith is a gift of Goo, the same Being llbo bestows
grace to enable us to bell81e other things, can lilm-

wise impart of it t.o enable us to believe bis mm

existence).l

Descartes' interest was to establish t.he ezi.atence ot God tor

the benefit of our deali11g with sceptics and scoffers. It ia quite
probable that in thio task he tailed. His other work in pbiloaopb7

also contributed tmvard a negative religious attitude, as Neva
• points outi
Descart.os bad simply wanted to reconstruct theology lflthout breaking with established dogma. But the
drift of developw:mt was tonrd absolute divorce. The
individual in his insist.enee on absolute treedom ot 2
thought ema.11cipat-ad himself rrom external authority.

It WOUld seem ~en that theologlcal4' Descartes tailed on every score.

or

course, he is still a sufi'icientl3 important figure 1D philosophy

and even in Christian thought to irarr&Dt a paper

to

exam:t M in greater detail bi& method and his

ot this kind it onq

ataJ>b19!.e&•

We do

not want to under-estimate Descartes• Be tocusaed. people's attention
on aom very basic problem. And be contributed mam;r ideas ot yast

1. Rene Descartes, lfedi.tations, P• 6S.
2. J. tleve, History 2!. cbrlst!an Thoyht, II, P• SJ,.
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izaportance to the field of thought. Die question now to 'be ccnsidere~ is. the 1,e;i.at,ion of tho Assur.anc.e

or

Descartes to Christian

•

#

'

•

Asaurance.

It is the belief' of tl1e aut.bo~ that one ·nust ·~

We have already mantioned the tact that the method

guish methods.

..

'

ot science dil'fers radi~ from
ot

the arts.

will dii'.ter.

diat1n-

the method employed 1n the atudi,

Even within the realm of science itaelt the •thods

Cer'GainJ.¥, the scientist•a approach to, physical prob-

lams will be complate:cy different .frail b1a approach to the probl.8119

or sociology or psychology. In some caaea

pure induc~on will be

employe~.

In othe1.. cases the method will be deductive or intro-

spective.

In different studies the time for hypothesising will

vary, the time f 01"' gathering data will Yar:f and the. •thod ot testing

data wi1;l change.
The stuey of God is .not a. physical a~~

data a~t God.

One· does not gat.her

It is true one way- gather data concemiDg people •s

spiritual experiences or concerning differing ethical standar~.
I

But God is only inadequately reflected in na~ or 1n the human

psychology.

As Brunner· and many other theologiamJ c o n ~

point

out, in order to lmow God, God must reveal ~ l f• He 1a a Person-

al.it! and t.herefore can only be knOIID by a~-revelation. How it 1s

true that

He is partially.

revealed in tbe human Jlind. II.an DOES haft

an innat.e knowledge of God. But this is not su.tticient for

uaurance•

!be method of stueying God, and it can•t re~ be called• •t.hocl.
1s

b.Y faith.

"Faith is the evidence • • • the substallce•.•
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0£ course, in our study of God, we dare not target that it 1a

Christ who revea'l s God 'l:,o man. · Christian 838urance is one ot faith

in Christ. Let us not com:uso, ho-.ever, the •assurance a, faith•
lli~ 8 C!1ristiau assurauce 0 , although tho terms aro of'ton used in tbe

saa> iooaning.

certainty

T'ae nassurance of faith• i s ~ with t.be

.

.

.2f ~

salvation. This does not £ind arq place in Descartes.

Descartes is interested in tho certainty ct existence. That 1s tho
point' o£ comparison with Christian assurance. Tbe Cbriatian 1a

certain or assured of God• s existence, but that certainty ia one of
faith.

It is a certainty .founded in satisfied need. Its assurance

lies o-,.rts:lde of ourselves. It is more like the Bart.bian •Cogitor,
ergo sum. 11

Existentially speaking, I on]i find liJf&Gl.£ and realise

or wy desperate need, am drawn to
very real sense he •mow• me. It

nwaeli when I, being conscious
God by His Holy Spirit.

In a

1s His personally given self-knowledge which I perceive by faith

which is IilY' guarar1tea of Bis existence.
As to the general oortainty which Descartes was seeldng, that

upon which. he can foumi a ~ practical pbilosopey or life. Thia
practical philosophy of li£e is guaranteed by our taith in God and

our knowledge of His doo)jnating love for us. Our assurance in the
world is again built upon .faith. But i t is a faith in sometbiDg
enacted beyond

ot coniz.01 it

.2!!!: sphere~ control. Were it within

CNr sphere

would inevitably lack certainty becauae it would be

at once finite a11d subjective. But salntion being e n ~ God's
doing makes it absolute.

Ms

iS turl,her true be~• _
aalvation•
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has

to do 1dt h the renelral.

or proper relations wit.h ~ the

armibil.ation of which was our responsibility. The ottwe aa
inf1Dite and it required the infinite God and 1ntinite low to

vicarious]¥ substitute for infinite.·pumahlll!nt. This tact, that

it is the Offended who must tl1rougb low forgi:ve1 and tb1e tact.,

our turtber USUl"Any doctr-.lne muc.ri takes salvation Ol11; or the hands ot God

tbat the Offended through love DID forgive, ia
ance.

and places it into t,tre hands of men, that substitute• 1IOl'ka

tor

grace, destroys the Christian certainty ot fa1t.h. Having such

certainty the Christian has laid tor him the foundations ot tbe
ethical. life whose pr"lrae principlo is oolf-less love. Ue can pro-

ci!ed 111th confi dence.

The existence

or the

material world is

guaranteed f or him because he knows it is tho creation ot God.

Hor does his l"'eligion hinder the study of the plvaical world with
whatever oothod can be best adapted to tho particular problematic

situation.· So, perhaps e can agree with Barth,· tba praclical

lii'e of t he .Christian is built not on the eertaint7 ot biB own
ad.stance, but on ·the certainty of Qod•s

One milst hold Descartes

suspect.

low.

Qie feels that he, a Rmum

Catholic, felt the same lack of assurance that tbe medieval acholaatics found and· tried to elir.dnate tbroUBh reason, t.bat luther
found and tried to eliminate with 1")rks• Both tailed and in t.he

end all must fail who do· not understand that the world• liw in
1a but wry inadequate~ known. We stud;y and •

observable phenomena,

118

probe, •

correlate

app]1' our inductiw and deductive •tbods

63

and advance our hypotheses. And in the end our aociarn science

with a.U of its facts is no

l¥>1"C

than a set

ot antal constructe

which best explain the observable phenoama at vq particular time.

U.. tacts require nev theories; ult.imat,e truth ·:1a the moat. ·eluaiw
' of quests.

.wther, failing in works, aight haw 'tried the ll8t.bocl
'
.

or Descartes and failed

again. But be did . not. Be found certainty"

t.brough faith in the God who is
forover.

the ·same

JUtAtrdat,

today' and
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